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THE HOMELESS: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
ON BEHALF OF A POLITICALLY POWERLESS
GROUP
Neil V. McKittrick*
I. Introduction
Homelessness' in the United States is a significant social problem.2
Although homelessness is not a new phenomenon, the contemporary
* Associate, Hill & Barlow, Boston, Massachusetts. A.B., 1983, Brown Uni-
versity; J.D., 1987, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to express
my gratitude to Karen Hoffman, Esq., Professor Alex Johnson, Professor Philip
Merkel and Bruce Steen, Esq., for reading various drafts of this Article and offering
their suggestions. I would also like to recognize the assistance of Terry McKittrick,
without whom this Article would never have been completed.
1. Researchers and state legislators define homelessness in several different ways.
Each attempt at categorization deems those who sleep in the streets and those who
reside in shelters to be homeless people. A broader definition also encompasses
those forced to stay with family or friends because they lack a place of their own,
and those currently in hospitals or jails who will become homeless upon release.
Although this definition tends to provide a more complete picture of the problem,
most states define homelessness more restrictively to exclude those families forced
to "double up" in an apartment. The Federal Response to the Homeless Crisis:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 398 (1984) (report of Mario Cuomo, Governor of New York)
[hereinafter Federal Response].
This Article defines homeless people as "those individuals and families who lack
sufficient resources to provide for their own shelter." H.R. REP. No. 47, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1985) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 47]. The House Report describes
typical dwelling places of the homeless: "Such persons are found in emergency
shelters, transition houses, Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels, the streets, subways,
bus terminals, living under bridges and in abandoned buildings." Id.
2. The number of homeless is widely debated. A Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) report released in May 1984, estimated that 250,000 to
350,000 people are homeless nationwide. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at
7. However, the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a shelter provider
and advocacy group in Washington, D.C., estimates that there are 2 to 3 million
homeless Americans. See id. Unfortunately, neither estimate rests on an actual count
of the homeless population because many of the homeless avoid shelters and cannot
easily be counted. See id.
The HUD report has been attacked as an effort to deny the existence of the
problem or to minimize its magnitude so that the federal government will not have
to address the situation. See HUD Report on Homelessness: Joint Hearing Before
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homeless population is different from its predecessors. In the past,
the majority of homeless people were elderly white males,3 many of
whom were alcoholics who lived in metropolitan "Skid Row" dis-
tricts .4
The "new" homeless are more diverse, encompassing more mi-
norities, women and younger people.' Increasingly, the ranks of the
homeless include entire families. 6 In short, the number of homeless
the Subcomm. on Hous. and Community Dev. of House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs and the Subcomm. on Manpower and Hous. of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984). Representative
Barney Frank (D.-Mass.) described the report as "intellectually shoddy, methodo-
logically lacking, and morally incredibly callous." See id. (statement of Rep. Barney
Frank).
Despite the inability of researchers to determine the number of homeless, studies
have identified two important trends: the number of homeless has been increasing
annually and "the homeless exist in epidemic proportions." H.R. REP. No. 47,
supra note 1, at 7. Moreover, whether there are 250,000 or 3 million homeless, the
problem "has become so overwhelming that public and private shelters do not have
the capacity to meet the demand." Id. at 8. Specifically, HUD's report stated that,
nationally, shelters can house 110,000 people each night. Id. Even using HUD's
lower estimate of the homeless population, this means that over 100,000 people lack
shelter nightly. Id. at 8-9.
3. Homelessness in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and
Community Dev. of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982) (statement of Kim Hopper, National Coalition for
the Homeless) [hereinafter Homelessness in America].
4. See id.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 24. Studies indicate that the average
age of the homeless population is 34. Forty-four percent of the homeless are
minorities, 1307o are single women, and 21076 are members of homeless families. Id.
Two studies, conducted by researchers at the University of Southern California and
Harvard Medical School, indicate that homeless families now comprise 28% of the
homeless population in major cities. See USA Today, Sept. 18, 1986, at 7A, col.
4.
6. See Wash. Post, Apr. 18, 1987, at Al, col. 1. A United States Conference
of Mayors report labelled the increase in homeless families the most significant
change in the homeless population. See id. For example, in December 1985, the
New York Times reported that New York City was housing four thousand families
a day. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1985, at B3, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 14,
1985, at 31, col. 1. Hundreds of homeless people spent nights in welfare offices
because no city shelter was available. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
Unlike the poor of the past, the contemporary homeless are not confined to Skid
Row districts but can be found throughout modern American cities. Federal Response,
supra note 1, at 999. For example, homeless people live on city-owned beaches in
Honolulu. See Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1985, at A3, col. 1. Homeless people also
inhabit the suburbs. Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1985, at B1, col. I (describing increased
occupancy rate at homeless shelters in suburban Maryland); Wash. Post, Nov. 2,
1985, at B3, col. 1 (describing use of motels to house homeless in suburban Virginia).
In essence, Skid Row has expanded, at least metaphorically. Instead of being
confined to a distinct location, it now exists as a "way of life." Homelessness in
America, supra note 3, at 34.
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in the United States is greater now than at any time since the Great
Depression. 7 The size of this population and the number of families
it includes, suggest that; absent appropriate governmental action; a
permanent underclass of homeless people may soon develop.
Until recently, federal and state legislators had failed to implement
any comprehensive approach to the problem.8 Despite recent federal
legislation, however, governmental policies at all levels ha ,e failed
to address the problem effectively. 9 This Article argues first, that
judicial intervention on behalf of the homeless is necessary and
appropriate because the homeless constitute a politically powerless
group10 and second, that comprehensive legislation, beyond that which
has been enacted thus far, is necessary to address the causes of the
problem." In particular, Congress should enact a national statutory
right to shelter to aid the homeless.1 2 This Article maintains that the
omission of such a right from recently enacted federal legislation
renders that legislation inadequate. 3
Part II of the Article sets forth the judicial doctrine of political
powerlessness as developed by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Carolene Products Co.' 4 and Frontiero v. Richardson. Part III
then examines the application of the doctrine to the homeless as
victims of both discrimination and ineffective government policies.
Part IV discusses the bases for judicial intervention and advocates
expansive judicial interpretation and enforcement of state constitu-
tional provisions, state statutes and city ordinances to protect the
short-term needs of the homeless and provide a right to shelter. Part
V of this Article recommends long-term solutions to the problem of
homelessness. Specifically, Part V discusses the need for more effective
7. Federal Response, supra note 1. at 456; see also supra note 2. A Special
Task Force of the United States Conference of Mayors reported that the demand
for emergency food aid and shelter increased by approximately 25076 in 1986. Wash.
Post., Dec. 19, 1986, at AS, col. 1. During the winter of 1986-87, homelessness
increased 20% according to a survey conducted by the Partnership for the Homeless.
Wash. Post, Mar. 31, 1987, at A17, col. 3.
8. See infra notes 226-89 and accompanying text. In June 1987, Congress passed
the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat.
482 (1987). The Act constitutes the first major congressional act in this area. For
a discussion of its provisions and an analysis of its inadequacies, see infra notes
290-338 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 290-341 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 16-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 226-341 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 315-26 and accompanying text.
13. See id.
14. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
15. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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federal legislation to address the problem properly. In addition, Part
V evaluates the recent federal response to the homeless crisis, identifies
its flaws and suggests improvements.
II. The Doctrine of Political Powerlessness
The notion that courts should protect the politically powerless had
its genesis in Justice Stone's famous Carolene Products footnote 16
which suggested the possibility of heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative classifications that have an unfair impact on "discrete and
insular minorities" or that curtail minorities' use of the political
process.' 7 In reviewing an equal protection s challenge to a statutory
classification, the Supreme Court generally requires only that a ra-
tional basis exist for the classification.' 9 When the classification is
based upon race or national origin, however, it is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny; the classification is considered "suspect ' 20 and will
16. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
17. The footnote, in pertinent part, is set out below:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of con-
stitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
[flourteenth ....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the [f]ourteenth amend-
ment than are most other types of legislation ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial
minorities, . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect mi-
norities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
18. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (in "cases ... involving
distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether there
is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom
of the state legislatures") (citing Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959);
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)).
20. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) ("racial classifications
'constitutionally suspect' ") (quoting Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
At one time, the Court suggested that poverty was a suspect classification, see,
e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McDonald v. Board
of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), but that view has not prevailed. See
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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be sustained only if justified by a compelling state interest. 21 Degrees
of such heightened scrutiny have also been applied to classifications
based on gender22 and illegitimacy. 23
In Frontiero v. Richardson,24 the Supreme Court held that gender
was a suspect classification. 25 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
discussed several factors used by the Court to determine whether a
group is a suspect class. The first of these factors is whether the
group's characteristic is immutable. 26 Justice Brennan reasoned that
to be classified on the basis of a quality that one cannot change is
unfair. 27 The opinion noted that the historyn and continued practice 29
of discrimination against a particular group are important factors in
the consideration of whether a group constitutes a suspect class. In
addition, a suspect classification is likely to exist when the statute
at issue stereotypes a group without regard to the individual's ca-
pabilities,30 or when the statutory trait bears no relation to the
individual's ability to perform or contribute to society.3' Justice
Brennan also observed that the political powerlessness of a group is
a significant feature of the suspect class determination.3 2 In this
connection, he noted that women were denied the vote for much of
this country's history and continued to lack political power because
21. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982). The Plyler Court noted that
"[wjith respect to ... [suspect] classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the
mandate of equal protection by requiring the [s]tate to demonstrate that its clas-
sification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."
Id. at 217.
22. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)
("gender-based discriminations must serve important governmental objectives and
... the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives").
23. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) ("classifications based on
illegitimacy are not subject to 'strict scrutiny' . . . [but] are invalid under the
[f]ourteenth [a]mendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state
interests").
24. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
25. Id. at 688. Although the plurality held that gender was a suspect class, the
Court has not adopted this position. Instead, the Court considers gender a quasi-
suspect class receiving intermediate scrutiny. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27 (1982).
26. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 685.
29. Id. at 686.
30. Id. at 687.
31. Id. at 686.
32. Id.
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of past discrimination. Despite their numbers, women remained un-
derrepresented in the political arena."
The factors discussed by the Frontiero plurality 4 describe the sub-
jects of the Carotene Products footnote.35 Classes of persons who
can be characterized under Frontiero as politically powerless and
victims of stereotyping and discrimination generally comprise Carotene
Products' "discrete and insular" minorities. 6 Thus, the theoretical
basis for strict judicial scrutiny is Justice Stone's notion in Carotene
Products that the judiciary may have a responsibility to protect these
"discrete and insular" minorities. 37
III. Theoretical Justification for Judicial Intervention: The
Doctrine of Political Powerlessness and the Homeless
In the past, the term "discrete and insular" has referred primarily
to racial and ethnic minorities.38 This restrictive reading, however,
does not comport with the definition of that phrase offered by
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
35. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
36. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (strict scrutiny for
aliens who "as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority")
(citing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4). But cf. Lusky, Footnote Redux:
A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1105 & n.72 (1982)
("discrete and insular" classification for alienage is an "amazing assertion") [here-
inafter Lusky].
37. See J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530-31 (3d
ed. 1986); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1088
(1982) ("footnote [four] now is recognized as a primary source of 'strict scrutiny'
judicial review"); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (suspect
class status to groups historically " 'relegated to such a position of political pow-
erlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process' ") (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I,
28 (1973), and citing Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4).
38. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (core of equal protection clause is protection of blacks and other races
and Supreme Court logically extended this principle to prohibit classifications based
on national origin); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
105 (1973) (Marshall J., dissenting) ("[c]ertain racial and ethnic groups have frequently
been recognized as 'discrete and insular minorities' who are relatively powerless to
protect their interests in the political process") (citations omitted); see also Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("classifications based on alienage, like
those based on nationality or race are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example, of a 'discrete and insular' minority
for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate") (footnotes and citation
omitted). Justice Rehnquist has stated, in dissent, that only racial minorities should
be considered "discrete and insular" minorities. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 649-50 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Professor Louis Lusky, Justice Stone's law clerk at the time of the
Court's decision in Carolene Products.3 9 Although the Carolene Prod-
ucts doctrine may not provide a judicial remedy for all who lose in
the political process, 40 Lusky suggests that "discrete and insular applies
to groups that are not embraced within the bond of community
kinship but are held at arm's length by the group or groups that
possess dominant political and economic power." '41 Any group not
represented in the political process is unlikely to have its needs
addressed.4 2 The powerlessness of the homeless43 suggests that courts
should closely scrutinize the treatment the homeless receive at the
hands of the law.
Judicial intervention on behalf of the homeless can be further
justified by extending Professor John Hart Ely's "representation-
reinforcing" approach to judicial review. 44 Relying on the Carolene
Products footnote, Ely argues that courts should protect politically
unrepresented minorities from the majoritarian political system by
ensuring that decision-making is characterized by fair process. 45 Where
the decision-making process results in laws that infringe on the rights
of minorities, courts should intervene to protect minorities from the
political process. 46 Although Ely's theory of judicial review applies
to federal constitutional questions, its underlying theme-protecting
the politically powerless-can also justify judicial interpretation of
state law to aid the homeless.
A. The Homeless are Politically Powerless: Governmental
Indifference and Political Impotency
By definition, the homeless lack economic power. Since economic
power is closely related to political power in our society, it follows
that the homeless lack political power as well. As Justice Marshall
wrote in dissent in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,47
39. See Lusky, supra note 36, at 1093.
40. Id. at 1105.
41. Id. at 1105 n.72.
42. For a discussion of the early political powerlessness of blacks and the emergent
civil rights struggle, see generally J. BLOOM, CLASS, RACE, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (1987); SOUTHERN JUSTICE (L. Friedman ed. 1965); U.S. COMM'N ON
Civi RIGHTS, FIFTEEN YEARS A, O... RURAL ALABAMA REVISITED (December 1983).
43. See infra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
44. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) [hereinafter ELY].
45. See id. at 86, 148-70.
46. See generally id. at 135-36, 148-70.
47. 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (park service regulation permitting camping only in
designated area upheld against first amendment challenge brought by organization
wishing to demonstrate in non-designated area against plight of homeless).
1988]
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"the homeless are politically powerless inasmuch as they lack the
financial resources necessary to obtain access to many of the most
effective means of persuasion." 4
The political powerlessness of the homeless extends beyond their
economic trouble and inability to influence the political process fi-
nancially. As Justice Marshall observed, the homeless are physically
(and often, mentally) vulnerable because of the hardships that ac-
company their predicament. 49 Moreover, they are truly politically
impotent in that they are denied the right to vote in most states
because they lack permanent residences.50 Consequently, they have
48. Id. at 304 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Id. ("detrimental effects of homelessness are manifold and include psychic
trauma, circulatory difficulties, infections that refuse to heal, lice infestation and
hypothermia"). Not surprisingly, the homeless have greater medical problems than
the country's population at large. They suffer a high rate of tuberculosis, trauma,
acute respiratory disorders, lung disease and skin ulcers. The homeless are a high
risk population "because of their higher rate of substance abuse, constant exposure
to weather and trauma, inadequate diet and irregular hygiene, prolonged periods
on their feet, unwillingness or inability to obtain medical treatment and other factors."
Am. Med. News, Apr. 12, 1985, at 2, col. 3. The homeless mentally ill are easy
victims for criminals and die in disproportionate numbers. Rhoden, The Limits of
Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY
L.J. 375, 391-92 (1982).
50. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 304 n.4 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Note, Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless,
59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 530, 532 (1985) [hereinafter Legal Rights]. In addition, as
of 1980, seven states statutorily excluded the homeless from voting. Id. at 532 n.12
(citing A. REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, THE ELECTION PROCESS: LAW OF PUBLIC
ELECTIONS AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 17-18 (2d ed. 1980)).
Recently, suits in three jurisdictions established the right of the homeless to register
to vote. See Pitts v. Black, 608 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Committee for the
Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No. 84 Civ. 3477 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 14, 1984), cited in Pitts, 608 F. Supp. at 708; Silas, Alley Voters: D.C. Lets
"Homeless" Register, 70 A.B.A. J. 37 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter Silas]. Whether the
franchise will translate into political power for the homeless remains to be seen.
The case of Washington, D.C. may be illustrative. In the spring of 1984, the local
elections board denied three homeless men the right to register. The CCVN appealed
this denial on behalf of the men and the elections board reversed itself in June
1984, establishing registration procedures. By the middle of July, however, only
seven homeless people had registered. Id. Even after securing the right to vote, the
homeless may not choose to exercise that right. See id.
One commentator has suggested that the right to vote could lead to greater
legislation for the homeless as they become a political force. Legal Rights, supra,
at 556. This is unlikely. Homelessness has been defined as " 'a condition of
detachment from society characterized by the absence or attenuation of affiliative
bonds that link settled persons to a network of interconnected social structures.' "
Collin, Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 URB. LAW. 317, 317 (1984)
(quoting H. BAHR, SKID Row, AN INTRODUCTION TO DIsAFFrLIATION 17 (1973))
[hereinafter Collin]. Intuitively, one would expect the homeless to be more concerned
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no political voice through which to influence public policy.
Ironically, government policies contributed to the recent increase
in homelessness. For example, by providing tax incentives to devel-
opers to convert single-room occupancy hotels (SROs)51 into con-
dominiums, cities accelerated the process of gentrification.12 These
policies led to the depletion of the already shrinking stock of low-
income housing,53 thereby contributing to an increase in homeless-
ness.14 Similarly, by deinstitutionalizing55 many former state mental
patients, but failing to provide community care56 for them on release,
states contributed to an increase in the number of homeless mentally
with daily subsistence than with the political process and hence, not to be a cohesive
political force in themselves. The fact that so few people registered to vote in
Washington, D.C. supports this view. After all, the voting cases were brought during
a presidential election year in which registration was an important issue. Therefore,
these cases do not necessarily demonstrate enthusiasm for political involvement on
the part of the homeless.
Advocacy groups have heralded the cause of the homeless, but have accomplished
little politically. For example, the CCNV placed a right-to-overnight-shelter initiative
on the ballot in Washington, D.C., in 1984, and the electorate passed this initiative.
However, the District government blocked the statute's operation through the courts
even though the electorate passed the referendum. Wash. Post., Dec. 28, 1985, at
Al, col. 5. In May 1986, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court and declared the initiative valid. Board of Elections & Ethics v. District
of Columbia, 520 A.2d 671 (App. D.C. 1986).
51. SROs are one-room residences. Low income people often reside in SROs
because of the relatively low cost. See Werner, On the Streets: Homelessness Causes
and Solutions, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 11, 13 (1984) (study of homeless women in
New York found that approximately 50% lived in SROs before becoming homeless)
[hereinafter Werner].
52. Living Between the Cracks: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on
Aging, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1984) [hereinafter Between the Cracks]. Gentrification
denotes the process of urban renewal which rehabilitates downtown housing for the
affluent ahd eliminates low-cost boarding and residential hotels. Id.
53. See Collin, supra note 50, at 323. During the 1970's, the nation's supply
of SROs may have diminished by as much as 50076, a loss of 1 million units. H.R.
REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 3. New York City lost 81% of its SROs. Id. This
reduction had a significant impact on the low-cost housing supply. Cf. Werner,
supra note 51.
54. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 3 ("scarcity of low-income housing
appears to be the main cause of homelessness").
55. Deinstitutionalization "refers to the policy under which state governments
have reduced the number of residents in their psychiatric hospitals by releasing to
the community patients who do not require the intensive care of a hospital." Rapson,
The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 193, 193-94 (1980).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 4. An estimated 2000 Community
Mental Health Centers (CMHCs) were necessary to provide community care, but
only 800 were ever established. Id.
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ill people.17 Finally, the federal government's budget reductions in
the early 1980's, which cut federal programs and tightened eligibility
standards for program assistance, 8 pushed some people into poverty
or homelessness 9
Moreover, government entitlement programs designed to assist the
poor have failed to reach the homelessA0 Studies indicate that only
fifteen to thirty percent of the homeless receive any government
assistance . 6 Even those applicants who do satisfy the federal assistance
guidelines often do not receive aid because they have difficulty es-
tablishing their residency and documenting their eligibility for assis-
tance.6 2 For example, few homeless people receive food stamps, 63 and
those applying have been hampered by their lack of an address.
4
57. See Federal Response, supra note 1, at 425. Between 1955 and 1980, the
population of state mental hospitals declined from 559,000 to 138,000. H.R. REP.
No. 47, supra note 1, at 4. Not all of these patients became homeless, but studies
indicate that in certain cities nearly one-third of some shelters' occupants previously
received treatment in state hospitals. Federal Response, supra note 1, at 426.
58. For example, a re-examination of the eligibility of Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) recipients caused 491,300 people to lose benefits between 1980 and
1984. See Federal Response, supra note 1, at 187 (written statement of Joseph
Delfico, Associate Director, Human Resources Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office). Although more than 200,000 people won reinstatement on appeal, the
termination of benefits contributed to homelessness. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note
1, at 6.
59. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 6. In 1982, the poverty rate was
15%'o of the nation's population, the highest level in 15 years. See id. Between 1978
and 1982, the number of poor people increased from 24.5 to 34.4 million. The
Congressional Budget Office attributed some of the increase in poverty to the federal
programs cuts. Id.
60. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 6.
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id. at 6. In October 1986, however, Congress passed the Homeless Eligibility
Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 11001-11007, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-167 to
-170 (1986) [hereinafter Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act], which directed the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide a method of making Supplemental
Security Income (SSI), Medicaid and AFDC benefits available to eligible homeless
persons who do not reside in permanent dwellings or who do not have a fixed
home or mailing address. Id. § 11005(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-169 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1383(e)(3) (West Supp. 1988)). A similar provision protects homeless
veterans eligible to receive benefits. Id. § 11007(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-170
(codified at 38 U.S.C.A. § 3003(c) (West Supp. 1988)).
63. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 22. Many homeless people who live in
shelters have been ineligible for food stamps because they are deemed to be "in-
stitutionalized." Id.; see also infra note 64. Moreover, a congressional survey con-
ducted by the House Select Committee on Hunger found that only half of all
homeless people eligible for food stamps were receiving them. Wash. Post., Mar.
31, 1987, at A17, col. 3.
64. Schneider, Food Stamps Benefits and the Homeless, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
31 (1984). A state that denies the homeless food stamps solely because they do not
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Many of the homeless would probably also be eligible for Medicaid,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability
Income (SSDI) but they have not received benefits because they need
assistance in the application process. 65 Consequently, provision of
statutory benefits remains sporadic, and the homeless remain disabled
by their status as well as their predicament.
B. Applying the Frontiero Factors to the Homeless
The homeless have also been victims of discrimination and
stereotyping6-important factors inviting judicial intervention under
the Frontiero analysis of suspect classes. 67
Many localities engage in discriminatory treatment of the homeless;
other municipalities actually harass them. For example, after mer-
chants in Phoenix complained that the presence of street people
detracted from business, the city adopted an "Anti-Skid Row" zoning
ordinance to exclude shelters and food kitchens from the downtown
area.68 In addition, the city declared sleeping (or lying down) on
possess a fixed address violates federal food stamp eligibility regulations. See id. at
32. A state may not deny benefits to an otherwise eligible homeless person unless
the shelter at which he resides is classified as an "institution." 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(e)
(1988). A homeless person is "institutionalized" only if he eats two shelter-provided
meals daily for the majority of the month. Schneider, Food Stamp Eligibility for
Homeless Persons Who Reside in Shelters, 19 CLEAINGHOUSE REv. 141, 141 (1985).
One commentator argues that a homeless person who does not consume meals
at a shelter and is otherwise eligible for food stamps should clearly receive them,
and even if a shelter provides meals, the applicant should qualify. See id. at 142.
The Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 11001-11002,
100 Stat. 3207, 3207-167 to -168 (1986), amended certain provisions of the Food
Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2030 (West Supp. 1988), to define homeless
persons who live in a shelter as a "household" within the meaning of the Food
Stamp Act, see id. § 11002(b), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-168 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A.
§ 2012(i) (West Supp. 1988)), and to define "food" to include meals prepared for,
and served by, a public or private nonprofit establishment or shelter. See id.
§ 11002(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-167 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(g) (West Supp.
1988)).
65. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 20. For example, an estimated one-
third of the homeless in New York City are veterans, but according to a 1982
study, very few received any benefits and the Veterans Administration made little
effort to aid them, even though many may have been eligible for medical care,
pensions and the like. Id. at 21.
66. See infra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
68. See NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1984, at 26. In 1983, between 3,300 and 6,200
homeless people lived in Phoenix but the city failed to provide a single public
shelter. Werner, supra note 51, at 14. Moreover, the city condemned its two private
shelters to facilitate construction of a public plaza. Id. Today, the publicly-funded
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public property illegal, 69 and it declared garbage public property so
that picking through trash cans became theft.70
Hostility, or at least indifference, to the plight of the homeless
exists in other cities as well. During the renovation of its downtown
area, San Diego encouraged mission shelters to-depart so that the
renewal effort would not be "wasted." ' 71 In Seattle, merchants in
the newly renovated Skid Row district attempted to have street people
moved away, 72 and in Washington, D.C., the government built con-
crete covers on the heating grates to prevent the homeless from
sleeping on them. 7 Following public protest, these covers were re-
moved, but the initial construction demonstrated the antagonism that
characterizes much of the response to homelessness.74
Much of the hostility that underlies the zoning ordinances and
statutes directed against the homeless stems from a stereotype that
the homeless are "bums" or "drunks" who will damage property
or threaten neighborhood safety. 7" The present homeless population,
however, consists of many families and younger people who lose
housing because of economic hardships such as eviction or the loss
shelter in downtown Phoenix compiles a nightly list of the names and social security
numbers of each homeless person seeking shelter. See Lewin, At Shelter, Homeless
Monitored by Police, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at A10, col. 1. The shelter then
submits the list to the police who check to see if they have arrest warrants matching
any of the names on the list. See id. As a result, approximately 12 people are
arrested weekly at the shelter for minor infractions such as public drunkeness. Id.
at A10, col. 2. The police expect the number to decline, however, as word of the
arrest policy spreads. Id. at A10, col. 3. Thus, although beds for the homeless now
exist in Phoenix, one facility has adopted a policy which gives it "all the allure of
a minimum security prison," id. at A10, col. 1, and effectively deters some homeless
from seeking available shelter.
69. Werner, supra note 51, at 14. The courts eventually struck this law down.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1984, at 14.
73. See id.
74. Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young's reported offer to provide any homeless
person in Atlanta with a bus ticket out of the city and back "home," epitomizes
official callousness. Werner, supra note 51, at 14.
75. See NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1984, at 14. For example, President Reagan stated
that many of the homeless live in the streets "by choice." TiMr, Feb. 4, 1985, at
21. Similarly, a reporter found that the people of Arizona believed that many of
the homeless seek a warm climate in which to "sponge off the state." Feeding on
this attitude, the mayor of Tuscon's 1983 re-election campaign included a pledge
to get "the transients the hell out of town." NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1984, at 26. These
attitudes reflect the prevailing ignorance of the true demographic characteristics of
the homeless population. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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of a job.76 Some of the homeless continue to work but cannot afford
housing. 77 These people are not very different from many other
working people who could easily become homeless as a result of the
destruction of their home by fire, eviction from an apartment, or
the loss of a job.78 Thus, stereotypes of the homeless as vagrants
who are not worthy of aid inhibit some state and local governments
from taking action. 79 Such views suggest that, in an appropriate
context, the judiciary should intervene on behalf of the homeless.
The doctrine of political powerlessness 0 provides a structured man-
ner in which to better understand the plight of the homeless. By
applying the indicia of suspect classes set forth in Frontieroal to the
homeless, one develops a picture of a group mistreated and often
misunderstood by our polity. Although the equal protection clause82
may not be implicated by homeless individuals attempting to assert
a right to shelter in the courts, the theoretical basis for suspect class
analysis-Justice Stone's notion in Carolene Products of judicial
responsibility 83-justifies, at the very least, judicial activism in pro-
tecting the state constitutional and statutory rights of the homeless.
IV. Practical Bases for Judicial Intervention
Although the Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional
76. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 5; see also Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987,
at B3, col. 3 ("dispelling the myths of the homeless" as people who simply want
handouts). In New York City, 40%70 of the homeless people seeking shelter could
not obtain a job in 1982. Werner, supra note 51, at 13. Unemployment is one of
the leading causes of homelessness among the young. Id.
During the early 1980's, homelessness and unemployment both increased. The
unemployment rate rose from 5.807o in 1979 to 9.507o in 1983, before falling in
1984. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 5. In addition, during these five years
people remained unemployed for longer periods of time. Id.
77. See Federal Response, supra note 1, at 830 (testimony of Dr. Richard Ropers,
Field Studies, U.C.L.A.). In the Los Angeles study, 5007o of the homeless actively
sought work; 200o worked full or part-time but still were homeless. Id.
78. See Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1987, at B3, col. 3. For example, one woman in
Washington, D.C. lost her job and came home from work to find that her building
had been closed because of fire code violations. She and her family went to a
shelter. Id. Similarly, an electrical engineer lost his job because of health problems
and became homeless. Id.
79. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 19-26, 31-49 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
82. This Article does not address an equal protection argument on behalf of
the homeless, because, to date, the Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional
right to shelter. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 16-17, 37 and accompanying text.
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right to adequate housing, 4 some lower courts have based substantive
rights to shelter on state law. Although the adjudication of such
"social" issues raises concerns about judicial overreaching and the
type of remedy courts can devise, the judiciary has taken a more
activist role in other "social" problems. 5 Where legal rights are at
stake, courts should adjudicate the claims.8s In litigation on behalf
of the homeless, the statutory language in a particular jurisdiction
will provide the parameters of any substantive rights. Statutory in-
terpretation involves judicial discretion; however, requiring a state
to provide shelter to fulfill its statutory duty of care is well within
the courts' judicial power to interpret the law. 7 Accordingly, the
type of judicial action advocated here is a broad interpretation of
state laws to provide shelter for the homeless.
Most of the statutes on which advocates rely do not expressly
mention a right to shelter, but speak in general terms of the gov-
ernment's duty to aid indigent persons.8 Because the homeless are
destitute, courts should overcome this hurdle by concluding that the
homeless qualify as "needy" individuals within the meanings of these
84. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("[wle do not denigrate the
importance of decent, safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not
provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill").
85. School segregation is the best example of a social problem that was ignored
until the judiciary intervened. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). For the background of Brown, see KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: Tim HISTORY
OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
(1976). The Arkansas prison litigation, in which prisoners repeatedly brought suit
to improve prison conditions, provides an additional example of such judicial activism.
See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
86. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("lilt is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal
remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded").
87. See id. at 177 ("[iut is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule"); see also Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969) ("the existence of a statutory right implies
the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies").
88. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980) ("[elvery county
and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent
persons ... lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and
relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means . . ."); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAw § 62(1) (McKinney 1983) ("each public welfare district shall be responsible for
the assistance and care of any person who resides or is found in its territory and
who is in need of public assistance and care which he is unable to provide for
himself").
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statutes. 9 However, the nature of the remedy courts can impose and
the implementation of that remedy by the executive and legislative
branches of government are significant issues that may require ad-
ditional judicial action contemporaneously with, or subsequent to,
statutory interpretation. Courts possess broad equitable powers with
which to address these issues. Attendant obstacles can be overcome
by "[e]quity [which] will adapt established rules to any situation and
grant relief even though a case is novel and there is no precise
precedent for the relief to be granted.'"'9 As the Supreme Court has
said:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities
of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distin-
guished it. The qualitites of mercy and practicality have made
equity the instrument for ... adjustment and reconciliation between
the public interest and private needs as well as between competing
private claims. 91
A. The Right to Shelter
Several state constitutions and statutes contain provisions requiring
states to assist the needy. 92 Where case law suggests that these statutes
89. Cf. Nelson v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors, 190 Cal. App. 3d 25,
30, 235 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308-09 (1987) ("[slection 17000 [of California's Welfare
and Institutions Code] imposes a duty on the [clounty to relieve and support its
indigent residents; the statute does not exclude those indigent residents without
addresses").
90. New York & Brooklyn Suburban Inv. Co. v. Leeds, 100 Misc. 2d 1079,
1091, 420 N.Y.S.2d 639, 647 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1979).
91. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944). Courts of equity have
the power "to inquire into and correct mistakes, injustice and wrong in both judicial
and executive action ... when it invades private rights." Johnson v. Townsley, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 84 (1871). The maxim that equity will not suffer a wrong to
be without a remedy suggests that courts will intervene where rights are violated:
[Tihe power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere,
or it will present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous
absurdity in a well-organized government, that there should be no remedy,
although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist.
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 623 (1838).
92. At least eight states have constitutional provisions or statutes that courts
have interpreted to impose a mandatory duty to care for the needy. See ALA. CONST.
art. IV, § 88 ("[it shall be the duty of the legislature to require the several counties
of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor"); N.Y.
CoN sT. art. XVII, § 1 ("aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns
and shall be provided by the state"); CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980)
("[elvery county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent,
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establish a mandatory duty, 93 the homeless have a persuasive argument
to secure a right to state-provided shelter. 94 The seminal right-to-
shelter case is Callahan v. Carey.95 In Callahan, six homeless men
brought suit on behalf of all the homeless men in New York City, 9 6
poor, indigent persons"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-273(a) (Supp. 1988) ("[e]ach person
... [without support] shall be provided for and supported at the expense of the
town in which he resides"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 117, § 1 (West Supp. 1987)
("commonwealth ... shall provide assistance to residents of the commonwealth");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:1 (Supp. 1987) ("[wlhenever a person in any town
is poor and unable to support himself, he shall be relieved and maintained by ...
such town"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-109 (West Supp. 1987) ("public policy of this
[s]tate that every needy person shall, while in this [sitate, be entitled to receive ...
public assistance"). See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the West Virginia decision holding that § 9-6-7 of the West Virginia Code is a
mandatory provision which extends to the homeless.
Generally, the use of the word "shall" makes the provision mandatory. See Nelson
v. West Virginia Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 300 S.E.2d 86, 89 (W. Va. 1982) ("well
established that the word 'shall,' in the absence of language in the statute showing
a contrary intent on the part of the [1legislature, should be afforded a mandatory
connotation"); see, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. App. 3d 44, 46-47, 128 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (1976) ("[slection 17000 provides
that '[e]very county and every city and county shall . . . support all ... indigent
persons' . . . [i]t is clear that section 17000 imposes . . . a mandatory duty") (emphasis
in original); Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S. 2d
728, 731 (1977) ("legislative history, as well as the mandatory language of the
provision itself ... [make] clear that section 1 of article XVII imposes upon the
[sitate an affirmative duty to aid the needy").
Additional state statutes contain similar language. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 26-2-102 (1982) ("purpose of this article to promote the public health and welfare
of the people of Colorado by providing ... public assistance for needy individuals");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 501 (1985) ("purpose of this chapter [is] . . .to promote
the welfare and happiness of all of the people of this [s]tate by providing public
assistance to all of its needy"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4307(1) (Supp.
1987) ("[miunicipalities shall provide general assistance to all eligible persons at the
expense of that municipality"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.580 (Vernon 1983) ("[p]oor
persons shall be relieved, maintained and supported by the county of which they
are inhabitants"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-6-2 (Supp. 1987) ("purpose of this chapter
[is] to provide public assistance to residents of the state ... who are in need and
who meet the eligibility requirements"); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 11.002 (Vernon
1980) ("purpose of this title is to establish a. program of social security to provide
necessary and prompt assistance to the citizens of this state who are entitled to
avail themselves of its provisions"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2501 (1981) ("policy
of the state [is] . . .that . . . [i]ts social welfare programs shall provide assistance
and benefits to persons of the state if proven need thereof and eligible").
93. See supra note 92.
94. See infra notes 95-114, 137-46, 166-82 and accompanying text.
95. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 5, 1979),
aff'd mer., 118 A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't 1986).
96. The trial judge later denied certification of the class action. The court deemed
certification unnecessary because government operations were involved and any
resolution of the case adverse to the government would, by stare decisis, bind the
government in its dealings with the prospective class members. Callahan, N.Y.L.J.,
July 18, 1980, at 6, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
THE HOMELESS
claiming that the state and city had violated their right to safe and
adequate shelter under the state constitution, 9 state statutes98 and a
city ordinance. 99 The constitutional provision in question provides:
The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions,
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may
from time to time determine.' °°
Both the legislative history,10 1 and case law'02 indicate that this section
creates an affirmative governmental duty. The New York State Social
Services Law more explicitly requires the public welfare districts to
assist the indigent:
Subject to reimbursement in the cases hereinafter provided for,
each public welfare district shall be responsible for the assistance
and care of any person who resides or is found in its territory
and who is in need of public assistance and care which he is
unable to provide for himself.03
97. See Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4; see also N.Y. CONST.
art. XVII, § 1.
98. See Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4; see also N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW §§ 62(1), 131(1), 131(3) (McKinney 1983).
99. See Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4; see also NEW YORK,
N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 24, § 604-1.0(b) (1978) (current version at § 21-114(b) (1986)).
In addition, the plaintiffs asserted federal constitutional equal protection claims
because they were similarly situated with other indigents who received state home
relief. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 22, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-72581 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1979). Among other benefits, persons on home relief receive
support for shelter. The plaintiffs, who received no aid, were typically in greater
need than those on relief. Id.
100. N.Y. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 1.
101. See Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum at 39, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-72581
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (quoting III Revised Record of the Constitutional
Convention 2126 (1938)). At the 1938 Constitutional Convention, Edward F. Corsi,
the Chairman of the Committee on Social Welfare, articulated the purposes of the
amendment:
Here are words which set forth a definite policy of government, a concrete
social obligation which no court may ever misread. By this section, the
committee hopes to achieve two purposes: First, to remove from the area
of constitutional doubt the responsibility of the [s]tate to those who must
look to society for the bare necessities of life; and, secondly, to set down
explicitly in our basic law a much needed definition of the relationship
of the people to their government.
Id.
102. See Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d
728, 731 (1977) ("[i]t is clear that section 1 of article XVII imposes upon the [s]tate
an affirmative duty to aid the needy").
103. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 62(1) (McKinney 1983). Although the statute provides
for reimbursement of local districts, the duty to assist the poor is not contingent
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In addition, the New York City Administrative Code specifically
provides for municipal shelter. °4
In Callahan, the New York Supreme Court granted a temporary
injunction requiring the state and city defendants to provide shelter
space for 750 men. 05 Pending the outcome of the suit, the men were
to receive lodging and board.1o6 In support of its decision, the court
simply cited, without elaboration, relevant state constitutional, stat-
utory and administrative provisions. 0 7 The parties subsequently en-
tered into a consent judgment under which the city agreed to supply
shelter to any man who sought it.108 Each applicant had to qualify
for New York State "home relief" or have a "physical, mental or
social dysfunction" which caused him to need temporary shelter.' °9
The consent decree also mandated specific minimum health and safety
conditions at shelter facilties."ll
Although the resolution of Callahan by consent judgment"' renders
the precedential value of the case uncertain,' the court's initial
upon state reimbursement. See Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 55, 332 N.E.2d
303, 310, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422, 431 (1975) ("clear that county's duty to provide assistance
[under Social Services Law §§ 62(1), 131(1)] is not dependent upon the receipt of
equivalent money from the [s]tate"); see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney
1983) ("duty of social services officials . . . to provide adequately for those unable
to maintain themselves").
104. The New York City Administrative Code provides:
It shall be the duty of the commissioner or of the superintendent of any
municipal lodging house acting under him, to provide for any applicants
for shelter who, in his judgment, may properly be received, plain and
wholesome food and lodging for a night, free of charge, and also to
cause such applicants to be bathed on admission and their clothing to
be steamed and disinfected.
NEW YORK, N.Y., ADrnuN. CODE ch. 24, § 604-1.0(b) (1978) (current version at § 21-
114(b) (1986)).
105. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Dec. 5, 1979), aff'd mem., 118 A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't
1986).
106. Id.
107. Id.; see supra notes 97-99, 103-04 and accompanying text.
108. Final Judgment by Consent, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County Aug. 26, 1981).
109. Id. at 3.
110. See id. The decree required that each resident receive a bed made with clean
linens and a locker for his belongings. The decree also obligated the city to provide
showers and laundry services at least twice a week. Finally, the decree prohibited
the staff-to-resident ratio from falling below two percent and required an attendant
trained in first aid to be on duty at all times. Id. at 4, 8.
111. Two factors may explain why Callahan culminated in a consent decree. First,
the court's opinion suggests that it was disposed to rule in favor of the homeless.
See Callahan, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4. Agreeing to a consent decree
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determinations in granting the injunction have a solid basis in the
applicable statutory language." 3 The court stated that the plaintiffs
were "entitled to board and lodging ... and it is incumbent on
those public officials responsible for caring for the needy to find
such lodgings." 4 Given that the relevant statutory provisions placed
an affirmative duty on the government to assist the poor, the court
could rationally conclude that sheltering the homeless came within
the parameters of those statutes.
As the problem of homelessness worsens, courts are likely to
interpret statutes broadly in the belief that a judicial solution to the
was probably politically expedient for the state and city because the government
may have had to provide better housing arid services if the case had gone to finaljudgment. Second, the extent of the homelessness problem probably influenced the
government representatives. The homelessness crisis had grown to such proportions
that state officials probably felt compelled, possibly by humanitarian concerns, to
take some action, especially given the statutory mandate. But see Note, Establishing
a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 939, 947 (1984) (labelling
Callahan a "fluke" in which plaintiff's argument was "an imaginative strategy that
worked primarily because it was employed at the right time and in the right place").
These factors may also explain why analogous cases in other jurisdictions have
been settled. For example, suit was filed in Hartford, Connecticut, because the city
had no public shelter for the homeless. Lubetkin v. City Manager (Conn. Super.
Ct. filed Feb. 4, 1983), reported in Werner, Homelessness: A Litigation Roundup,
18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1255, 1257 (1985) [hereinafter Litigation Roundup]. The
plaintiff's theory rested on the following statutory provision:
(a) [E]ach person who has not estate sufficient for his support, and has
no relatives of sufficient ability who are obliged by law to support him,
shall be provided for and supported at the expense of the town in which
he resides ... or, if he has no residence, of the town in which he becomes
in need of aid.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (Supp. 1985); In essence, the statute required a
welfare officer, after being informed by a general assistance applicant of his plight,
to provide the applicant with the necessary food, shelter or medical care. Litigation
Roundup, supra, at 1257-58. In the settlement of Lubetkin, the defendants agreed
to comply with state law and their own regulations. Id.
In Philadelphia, plaintiffs sued to enforce a 1982 city ordinance which states that
the city " 'shall provide for the establishment, operation and maintenance of
emergency shelters as needed for the homeless.' " Today, a consent judgment
obligates the city to provide shelter to any non-dangerous person who requests it.
N.Y. Times, May 5, 1985, at 60, col. 3.
Los Angeles has also settled right to shelter cases based on similar statutory
language. See, e.g., Eisenheim v. Board of Supervisors, No. C-27953 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1983), reported in Litigation Roundup, supra, at 1259.
112. See Final Judgment by Consent at 2, Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 26, 1981) (consent decree does not constitute final adjudication
"of any issue of fact or law").
113. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
114. Callahan v. Carey, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Dec. 5, 1979), aff'd mem., 118 A.D.2d 1054, 499 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep't
1986).
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problem is necessary. For example, in Seide v. Prevost,"5 a federal
district court recognized the powerlessness of the homeless and the
mentally ill. Seide was brought on behalf of state psychiatric patients
to enjoin the operation of a shelter for the homeless on the ground
that it deprived the patients of their rights to safety and treatment.
11 6
The court felt compelled to note:
[T]he poignancy of the position of these populations [the homeless
and the mentally disturbed], each to a very large extent the product
of the swift, conflicting currents of our society, each without a
political constituency to which they can refer their suffering, each
driven to resort to the courts for enforcement of constitutional
and state rights to achieve humane treatment at the hands of the
society. While the impropriety of judges determining social policy
is frequently sounded by those with loud trumpets, nonetheless,
in the context of the needs of the homeless and the mentally
disturbed, it is the court that must decide the issues brought before
it and seek to achieve a just result and do so promptly." 7
The Seide court held that the homeless shelter could continue to
operate." 8 The tone of Seide suggests that the court was swayed by
the magnitude of the homeless crisis and by the powerlessness of
the homeless to achieve redress from the legislative and executive
branches of government." 9
The notion that courts become frustrated by a lack of political
action on behalf of a powerless group may also explain Hodge v.
Ginsberg.20 In Hodge, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that
the state welfare department had a statutory duty 2' to supply emer-
115. 536 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
116. See id. at 1124-25.
117. Id. at 1125.
118. Id. at 1138.
119. Cf. id. at 1125-26 ("[t]o proceed with the necessary legal analysis without
recognition of social and political issues involved would be to ignore the obvious").
120. 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983).
121. At that time, the following provision governed the department:
[The Welfare Department] may develop a plan for a comprehensive system
of adult protective services including social case work, . . . home care,
day care, counseling, research and others. It shall offer such services as
are available and appropriate in the circumstances to persons who, other
than for compensation have or intend to have the actual, physical custody
and control of an incapacitated adult and to such incapacitated adults
or to adults who may request and be entitled to such protective services.
Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 247 (quoting W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-7 (Supp. 1982)
(amended 1984)).
The provision has since been amended to substitute the word "shall" for "may"
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gency shelter, food and medical services to the homeless.1 22 The state
argued that provision of services was discretionary under the statute. 123
The court ruled, however, that once the welfare department developed
a system of aid, it had to offer the available services to those entitled
to receive them. 24 Because the court found that a homeless person
was an "incapacitated adult" within the meaning of the statute, it
concluded that the homeless could not be denied relief offered to
other incapacitated adults. 25
The West Virginia court's interpretation of the statute may be
criticized by those opposed to judicial intervention. In the statute,
"incapacitated adult" refers to mentally or physically disabled per-
sons, or those with another "infirmity" which constrains their ability
to perform daily life-sustaining functions. 26 At first glance, home-
lessness does not appear to fall within the typical meaning of "in-
firmity"; however, the court reasoned that homelessness is a condition
which threatens daily life functions and prevents one from maintaining
reasonable health. 127 Accordingly, the court held that aiding the home-
less was within the statutory purposes. 128
The West Virginia Legislature could have rejected this interpretation
when the statute was amended, one year after Hodge was decided. 129
Instead, in amending the statutory language to provide that the
department "shall"-rather than "may"-develop an assistance plan, 30
the legislature arguably solidified the Hodge decision.' More im-
portantly, the West Virginia Legislature was unsuccessful in its attempt
to overrule the court. When the West Virginia House of Delegates
passed a bill that attempted to overrule Hodge by redefining "in-
capacitated" so that the homeless would not automatically fall within
in the first line. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-7 (Supp. 1987). The West Virginia
Code defines "incapacitated adult" as "any person who by reason of physical,
mental or other infirmity is unable to independently carry on daily activities of life
necessary to sustaining life and reasonable health." Id. § 9-6-1. The court concluded
that the homeless were incapacitated because by reasons of the "recurring misfortunes
of life," they cannot sustain daily life activities. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 250.
122. Id. at 251.
123. Id. at 250. See supra note 121 for text of the provision.
124. Id. at 251.
125. Id. at 250.
126. See supra note 121.
127. Hodge, 303 S.E.2d at 250.
128. Id. at 251.
129. See 1984 W. Va. Acts 646.
130. See id.; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6-7 (Supp. 1987).
131. See supra note 92 for a discussion of the significance of the statutory usage
of "shall."
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the category, the state senate failed to act on the bill. 3 2 Therefore,
Hodge remains good law.
The sequence of events in West Virginia demonstrates the significant
role the judiciary can play in addressing the problem of homelessness.
The West Virginia Supreme Court interpreted existing statutes broadly
to provide the homeless with a right to shelter and services.' Once
the court acted, the onus was on the legislature to reject the judicial
solution if it disagreed with the statutory interpretation. Since the
West Virginia Senate Committee did not act to amend the statute,13 4
the majority of that house can be presumed to have acquiesced in
the judicial interpretation. Therefore, the court's broad interpretation
of the statute provided two distinct benefits. First, by engendering
legislative debate, it contributed to public discourse regarding home-
lessness, and second, it provided shelter and assistance to a very
vulnerable population. Other state courts can have a similarly sig-
nificant impact on homelessness by requiring state and local gov-
ernments to provide shelter whenever a state statutory basis for the
right exists.
B. The Remedy for Statutory Violations
After a court determines that the homeless are entitled to assistance
under a state statute, the inquiry shifts to the type of remedy to be
imposed for violation of the statute. Arguably, shelter is the only
remedy that can provide sufficient aid within the meaning of the
statute. Some states, however, seek to fulfill the statutory goals by
providing monetary assistance.' 35 In New York, homeless families 13 6
have challenged this practice.
In McCain v. Koch,'37 the city and state defendants claimed that
they had no duty to house homeless families, 3 ' but only had to
132. See Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1983, 86 W. VA. L.
REv. 479, 486 (1984) (citing H.B. 1984, 66th W. Va. Leg., 1st Sess. (1983)).
133. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 137-62 and accompanying text.
136. Housing homeless families has been an especially severe problem in New
York City. Because of a shortage of shelter space, many families have been forced
to spend nights in city welfare offices. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985, at B3, col.
1; see also supra note 6.
137. 127 Misc. 2d 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), modified,
117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1st Dep't 1986), rev'd in part, 70 N.Y.2d 109,
511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987).
138. Id. at 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987. In response to this argument the court
observed: "This, from the city whose Statue of Liberty welcomed immigrants to
these shores, and proudly proclaimed: 'Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to
me.' " Id.
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assist them to locate shelter for thirty days, after which time cash
grants would fulfill the government's responsibility. '3 9 Pending ad-
judication of this issue, the court employed its equitable power to
require that once the city undertook to provide emergency shelter,
it was obligated to provide housing which complied with minimal
standards.'40 The court stated that, "[i]n a civilized society, a 'shelter'
which does not meet minimal standards of cleanliness, warmth, space
and rudimentary conveniences is no shelter at all.' ' 41
On appeal, the appellate division granted a preliminary injunction
barring the city from denying emergency shelter to homeless families
because the plaintiffs had demonstrated a "strong likelihood of success
on the merits of their claims.' ' 42 After discussing Callahan, the court
stated that there was "no apparent reasonable basis for the [c]ity's
denial of emergency shelter to the plaintiffs."'' 43 The court recognized
that the dire shortage of low-cost housing meant that the families
would only receive shelter if the city provided it.'"
The appellate division's reasoning in McCain is sound because cash
grants would not fulfill the goals of the relevant provision of the
state constitution. 45 Unless the money was sufficient for the family
to obtain some type of shelter, grants would not help homeless
families to get off the street. As the court stated, "[t]he public
interest is better served by having them housed, than by forcing them
to find shelter and food that may be beyond their means to attain."' 46
139. Id.
140. Id. at 25, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 988. Although the appellate division later held
that the trial court had erred in establishing minimal shelter conditions, McCain v.
Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 216, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720, 731 (1st Dep't 1986), it was
subsequently reversed on this issue by the court of appeals, see 70 N.Y.2d at 120,
511 N.E.2d at 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
141. McCain, 127 Misc. 2d at 24, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
142. McCain, 117 A.D.2d at 211, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728. The appellate division,
noting that "New York State has made the care of its needy residents a constitutional
mandate," found it likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on their claim that article
17 of the state constitution requires the defendants to supply emergency shelter for
homeless families. Id. at 215, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 730. The court of appeals' subsequent
reversal of the intermediate courts' holding left this finding unaffected. See McCain,
70 N.Y.2d at 118, 511 N.E.2d at 65, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 921 ("right of eligible families
who are not receiving emergency housing to compel defendants to furnish it is the
issue in other parts of the [a]ppellate [d]ivision's order not before us on this appeal").
143. McCain, 117 A.D.2d at 214, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
144. Id. at 211, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
145. See id. at 215-16, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 730-31 ("the [clity's policy [of granting
cash allowances] simply ignores the brutal realities of the plaintiffs' situation [and]
... contravenes both the letter and spirit of the [s]tate's affirmative obligation to
aid all its needy residents under [s]ection I of [a]rticle 17 of the [sitate [c]onstitution").
146. Id. at 211, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
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One of the issues in McCain, the extent to which federal law
required that homeless families receive emergency shelter, 47 was ad-
dressed in Koster v. Webb. 14s Koster involved an action brought in
federal court under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 149 by homeless
families seeking to have New York State and Nassau County officials
supply them with shelter and emergency services pursuant to the
federal Social Security Act, 50 the state Social Services Law 5' and
the New York Constitution.12 The pertinent portion of the Social
Security Act was the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program,'53 which provides for emergency assistance to families. 5 4
Although the federal statute does not expressly require that shelter
be supplied to eligible homeless families,' the court noted that the
legislative history of the Social Security Act anticipated that shelter
would be one type of emergency service supplied. 5 6 Moreover, the
states that participate in the AFDC program must indicate whether
they will provide shelter.5 7 Because New York's regulations, prom-
ulgated pursuant to the federal Social Security Act, indicated that
shelter would be provided in emergency situations,' the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York reasoned that
the denial of shelter violated the Act. 59
147. See McCain v. Koch, 127 Misc. 2d 23, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1984), modified, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1st Dep't 1986), rev'd
in part, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987).
148. Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The plaintiffs also
alleged that other homeless families had received "grossly substandard shelters which
are a hazard to health and safety." Id. at 1135.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Claims under the Social Securities Act are actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974).
151. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 62(1), 131(1), 131(3) (McKinney 1983).
152. N.Y. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 1. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. See Koster,
598 F. Supp. at 1136.
153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1985).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1982).
155. See id.
156. Koster, 598 F. Supp. at 1137 (citing H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st.
Sess. 17-18 (1967)).
157. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(4) (1987).
158. See [1988] N.Y.C.R.R. § 372.4(d).
159. Koster, 598 F. Supp. at 1137. The court also noted that the plaintiffs stated
a valid state law claim because New York Social Service Law §§ 62(1) and 131(1)
provide for the assistance of the needy as required by article XVII, § 1 of the New
York Constitution and §§ 371(3) and 391(1) defines homeless and destitute children
as among the needy. Therefore, state law required that services be provided. Id. at
1!38.
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No decision on the merits has been reported in Koster,'60 but the
district court's initial reading of the state regulations is instructive. 6'
When regulations assert that emergency shelter will be provided to
families eligible for AFDC, a court can certainly order shelter as
the appropriate remedy. One might argue that this ruling will have
an adverse affect on the homeless, because states which, at present,
voluntarily commit themselves to provide emergency shelter to AFDC
families may change their regulations. Yet, absent a court order,
families may never receive emergency shelter if agencies are not
required to comply with their own regulations. The Koster court
recognized that without court enforcement, the agency's decision to
supply shelter becomes fully discretionary.
In sum, the Koster and McCain analyses should be a successful
avenue of litigation for homeless families in jurisdictions where emer-
gency shelter is part of the AFDC program. 62 Adequate shelter is
a better remedy than providing money because it is more likely to
help the homeless and fulfill statutory purposes.
C. Implementation of the Right to Shelter
Because state and local governments have not complied with consent
decrees and judicial rulings, courts have to remain involved in the
shelter problem even after the initial resolution of cases. For example,
the Callahan decree required constant monitoring and court enforce-
ment even though the standards were quite explicit. 63 The conditions
in women's shelters compelled homeless women to invoke the city's
160. In September 1985, the district court certified a plaintiffs class. Koster v.
Perales, 108 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The court divided the class into two.
subclasses, one encompassing "[njeedy families with children in Nassau County who
are eligible for and in need of emergency shelter" and a second similarly worded
subclass encompassing those families that received unsafe shelter. Id. at 47.
161. The precedential value of the decision, however, has been questioned in
dictum by the opinion's author. See Canaday v. Koch, 598 F. Supp. 1139, 1151
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[tlhis court's construction of the New York statutes [in Koster]
does not alter the fact that the issue is as yet undecided by New York courts").
Similarly, another court has questioned whether federal courts should address this
issue, given the discretion accorded to the states in connection with the administration
of AFDC benefits. See Canaday v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460, 1471-72 (S.D.N.Y.)
(invoking Colorado River abstention), aff'd sub nom. Canaday v. Valentin, 768
F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1985).
162. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 82-510(c) (1984).
163. Collin, supra note 50, at 328. The guidelines set forth in the Callahan decree
are "burdensome for both the courts and the plaintiffs .... Even when blatant
violations by the city were uncovered, these had to be brought to court again and
again." Id.
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constitutional obligation to provide shelter facilities for women that
complied with the Callahan standards for men's shelters. 64 The city
delayed providing necessary additional shelter when the number of
homeless persons increased.1 65 Separate court action was necessary to
make the city comply with health and safety standards for shelters.' 66
In 1982, the city even attempted to lower the court-mandated shelter
conditions, but the trial court that heard the subsequent action for
an injunction labelled the city's position a "cruel and unacceptable
hoax" to play on the homeless. 67
Similar litigation has been necessary in other jurisdictions to im-
plement judicial remedies. In California, a state welfare statute es-
tablished that localities have an affirmative obligation to care for
the needy, 68 but Los Angeles County's shelter relief program required
applicants to produce identification before receiving aid. 6 9 Since many
homeless had lost their identification papers while living on the streets,
the requirement precluded them from receiving shelter. 70 In Eisenhiem
v. Board of Supervisors,7' the California Superior Court issued a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the county from requiring
that shelter applicants present identification and ordering the gov-
ernment to provide immediate relief.'7 2 The parties incorporated these
terms into a stipulation of settlement subject to court approval. 73
164. Eldredge v. Koch, 98 A.D.2d 675, 676, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (1983) (homeless
women constitutionally entitled to treatment equal to that guaranteed homeless men).
165. See N.Y.Times, Dec. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 4 (describing New York City's
failure to prepare sufficient shelter for winter).
166. COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, REPORT ON LAWSUITS INVOLVING THE COALITION
1 (1985).
167. Id.
168. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1980). The provision obligates local
governments in the following manner:
[E]very city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor,
indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident,
lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved
by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals
or other state or private institutions.
Id.
169. Litigation Roundup, supra note 111, at 1259. Even if the homeless person
had identification, the program typically took longer than a week to provide relief.
Id.
170. Id.
171. No. C-27953 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 1983), cited in Litigation
Roundup, supra note 111, at 1259.
172. Litigation Roundup, supra note 111, at 1259.
173. Id.; see also L.A. Herald Examiner, June 13, 1984, at Al, col. 5. In Maticka
v. Atlantic City, No. L8306-84E (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1984), reported in Case
Development, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1341 (1985), the New Jersey Superior Court
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Further litigation in Los Angeles addressed the adequacy of gov-
ernment-provided shelter. In Ross v. Board of Supervisors,7 ' a "con-
sortium of legal services and public interest groups' '1 75 brought suit
on behalf of homeless people who received eight-dollar checks in
lieu of shelter. 7 6 The plaintiffs contended that eight dollars would
not secure housing at any of the "welfare hotels" in the county. 17
The trial court enjoined the Board of Supervisors from employing
this practice unless a sufficient amount of shelter was actually available
for eight dollars. 78 The litigation caused the county to end this
practice. 79
After finding that a statutory right to shelter exists in a particular
jurisdiction, a court is well within its power to enforce that right
and to oversee its implementation. 80 As long ago as Marbury v.
Madison,8' the Supreme Court stated that, "the very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."'18 2 Moreover,
"one of the first duties of government is to afford that protection."' 83
Although the implementation of shelter programs does not require
the broad structural injunctions used in school desegregation and
prison cases, 8 4 courts constantly monitor shelter conditions. This
stated that the state welfare agency's policy requiring homeless and destitute persons
to have a permanent address to qualify for aid was "charitably described as a run
around." Id. The court remanded the case to the state welfare agency so that
municipalities could provide "public assistance" to the homeless, but it failed to
address the issue of shelter specifically. See id.
174. No. 37,590 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. filed June 11, 1984), cited in Litigation
Roundup, supra note 111, at 1258.
175. Id.
176. Litigation Roundup, supra note 111, at 1258. In Los Angeles, the welfare
department supplies shelter through a "voucher" system. The department refers
homeless people to hotels that have agreed to house them on a deferred payment
basis from the county. Once the voucher hotels had been filled to capacity, subsequent
applicants were given an eight-dollar check with which to purchase shelter. Id.
177. Id. A study indicated that only seven hotels in Los Angeles County, with
a total of 627 rooms, rented rooms for eight dollars per night. Over a three-day
period, these hotels had only four vacancies. Id.
178. L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, (Metro), at 1, col. 1.
179. See id.
180. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Los Angeles County v.
Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 636, 122 P.2d 526, 529 (1942) ("[i]t is the [mandatory]
duty of every county in this state to relieve and support all indigent persons lawfully
resident [herein]").
181. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
182. Id. at 162.
183. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162-63.
184. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown,
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continuous stream of enforcement actions illustrates the powerlessness
of the homeless populations. Even after entering into consent decrees
to supply shelter pursuant to a statute, many states and cities still
fail to provide decent, habitable shelter. 85 This official hostility,
however, is not the only obstacle to housing the homeless.
In some communities, strident protest by homeowners has accom-
panied the placement of shelters,1 16 while other neighborhoods have
brought legal action to enjoin the operation of shelters. 8 7 In BAM
Historic District Association v. Koch,' s a neighborhood association
sought to enjoin New York City from establishing a shelter. The
association argued that the city deprived homeowners of property
and liberty interests by failing to give notice of the proposed opening
the Supreme Court ordered the district courts to monitor desegregation until its
earlier decision prohibiting racial segregation in public schools had been fully im-
plemented:
[T]he courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable
start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such
a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary
to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon
the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest
and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable
date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to admin-
istration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and revision of
local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing
problems. They will'also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants
may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a
racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of transition,
the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.
Id. at 300-01.
185. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
186. In the Anacostia section of Washington, D.C., residents protested vehemently
when the federal government opened a shelter without consulting the community.
Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1985, at D1, col. 2. They later held a rally and presented
petitions at the White House. Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1985, at C3, col. 1.
Community protest against implementation of shelter programs resembles resistance
to court-ordered desegregation. The analogy to desegregation is not perfect, but the
similarities merit attention. Striking among these is the hostility of communities
toward the establishment of homeless shelters in their neighborhoods. Fear of declining
property values, rather than prejudice against homeless people, allegedly produces
much of this antagonism. Nonetheless, the same arguments were made to justify
restrictive covenants that kept blacks from living in white neighborhoods. See Barrows
v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Like the attitudes of many'whites toward blacks
from the 1950's to 1970's, current views of the homeless reflect stereotypical notions.
187. Litigation Roundup, supra note 111, at 1262. Municipalities often invoke
zoning ordinances to prevent the operation of shelters.
188. 723 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1983).
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of the shelter in the community.8 9 Although the association framed
its arguments in due process terms, the Second Circuit recognized
that the homeowners' underlying concern was declining property
values resulting from the establishment of the shelter. 19 The court
held that there was no taking of the plaintiff's property and that
the community had no colorable liberty interest in preventing the
establishment of a shelter. 91 The circuit court affirmed the district
court's denial of the injunction because the neighborhood produced
no evidence demonstrating that the shelter would detract from the
community. Moreover, the court reasoned that the closing of the
facility would be detrimental to the public interest, given the need
for shelters for the homeless. 192
One New Jersey community made a similar attempt to force the
closing of a church-run shelter by enforcing a local zoning ordinance
that restricted the use of a lot to "other uses customarily incident
to the principal use."' 193 In St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. City of Hoboken, the New Jersey Superior Court ruled that
enforcement of the ordinance would conflict with the church's first
amendment exercise of religion; therefore, the ordinance had to
yield. 94 The first amendment was implicated because housing the
homeless was a traditional church function. 95 In addition, the court
emphasized the harm that would result if the shelter was closed.
Since the local governments relied on the churches to shelter the
homeless, the public interest mandated that the churches be permitted
to continue this practice. 196
Although these cases suggest different rationales for upholding the
placement of shelters, the magnitude of the social problem of home-
lessness has been a recurring theme in the courts' opinions. BAM
Historic District and St. John's emphasized that homelessness was
189. Id. at 235.
190. Id. at 237 (governmental action resulting in decline of property value does
not "deprive a person of property within the meaning of the [f]ourteenth
[a]mendment").
191. Id.
192. Id. at 236. The association also alleged that the city deliberately located
shelters in neighborhoods that had a disproportionate number of minorities, thereby
denying these communities equal protection. Id. at 235. The circuit court did not
reach this issue, see id. at 236, and no decision on the merits of this claim has
been reported.
193. St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 195 N.J. Super.
414, 418, 479 A.2d 935, 937 (Law Div. 1983).
194. Id. at 422, 479 A.2d at 939.
195. Id. at 421, 479 A.2d at 939.
196. Id.
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too serious a problem to allow other factors to interfere with in-
novative local approaches aimed at addressing homelessness. Courts
will do much to protect the rights of the homeless, and this judicial
action extends to derivative rights such as protecting shelters against
restrictive zoning ordinances which discriminate against the home-
less. 197
Because of the willingness of some courts to fill the void created
by political inaction or ineffectiveness, the homeless now have an
avenue through which to obtain shelter. Under the circumstances,
judicial intervention is appropriate. As the Seide court noted, "[d]espite
the intricacy of the social issues involved . . . it is better to have a
court resolution than none at all." 1 98 Although the conventional
wisdom is that the judiciary lacks competence to decide "social"
issues, this view is offset by the traditional protection courts provide
to those lacking political power.' 99 Where a jurisdiction has a statute
or constitutional provision concerning care for the needy, courts have
a duty to interpret those statutes. 200 In this situation, courts should
not refrain from deciding "social" questions such as the right to
shelter. This judicial intervention is limited in scope; it does not
require a court to develop rights out of whole cloth.
197. Cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In
Cleburne, the Supreme Court struck down a zoning requirement that rested on an
"irrational prejudice" against the mentally ill who lived in the facility at issue. Id.
at 450. Refusing to hold that the mentally ill constitute a suspect class, the Court
nonetheless found that the zoning requirement failed the rational basis test because
it was based on prejudice. Id. Because so few laws are invalidated for violating the
rationality test, the Court appears to have applied heightened scrutiny in Cleburne,
without labelling it as such.
Decisions such as BAM Historic District and St. John's serve an additional societal
interest. The establishment of small community shelters promotes community interests
by removing the homeless from neighborhood streets. See Federal Response, supra
note 1, at 711 (testimony of Robert Hayes, counsel, Coalition for the Homeless);
see also Schonfeld, "Five-Hundred- Year Flood Plains" and Other Unconstitutional
Challenges to the Establishment of Community Residences for the Mentally Retarded,
16 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1 (1988). This is in the community's interest because many
people find the presence of homeless people aesthetically or emotionally displeasing.
The establishment of community shelters may foster additional societal interests.
Creation of small shelters in neighborhoods, as opposed to huge shelters in downtown
areas, may increase interaction between the homeless and local residents. Through
this interaction, the misconception and stereotypes about the homeless may break
down. See ELY, supra note 44, at 157-61. In this way, communities can address
part of the Frontiero concern with discrimination and stereotyping. Moreover, as
local constituents become increasingly knowledgeable about the homeless, legislators
may be more likely to heed the call for aid to the homeless.
198. Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
199. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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Once a right to shelter exists, continuing enforcement of that right
is justified through the court's equitable powers. 20 The homeless are
particularly vulnerable; for a court to respond to the needs of the
homeless in equity is consistent with the historical use of the chan-
cellor's power, which extended to the protection of minorities and
other vulnerable persons.20 2 In short, courts are the proper institution
to interpret individual rights and to ensure that those rights are
protected.
V. Recommendations
Litigation on behalf of the homeless has been essential in securing
a right to shelter; however, this approach has limitations. Not all
jurisdictions have the requisite statutory language or appropriate city
ordinances providing for care to the needy, and courts in jurisdictions
with such statutes may interpret this language to be permissive rather
than obligatory. 203 More importantly, litigation can only achieve lim-
201. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
202. Equity jurisdiction was a delegation of parens patriae power to the chancellor
to intervene in cases in which people could not protect themselves. United States
courts inherited this jurisdiction. See In re Connor, 254 Mo. 65, 162 S.W. 252
(1913). Equity remains "alert to afford protection to the infants and to the aged,
to the mentally incompetent, to the victims of deception and to the rights of
minorities." Zaveski v. Kish, 138 N.J. Eq. 61, 62, 46 A.2d 665, 665 (1946). Extending
equity power to protect the homeless by way of injunctive relief for shelter comports
with traditional notions of equity because the homeless are among the most vulnerable
class of people in society.
203. Washington, D.C. now has a statute that explicitly provides for overnight
shelter. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -607 (Supp. 1987). The District of Columbia
Right to Overnight Shelter Initiative of 1984 (Initiative 17) received 72% of the
votes in the 1984 election. See Wash. Post, Nov. 7, 1984, at A41, col. 2. The
ballot initiative established that "all persons ... shall have the right to adequate
overnight shelter." D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (Supp. 1987). Adequate shelter was
defined as "that which to a reasonable degree maintains, protects and supports
human health, is accessible, safe and sanitary, and has an atmosphere of reasonable
dignity." Id.
Although the electorate approved Initiative 17, the District of Columbia successfully
challenged the law as an improper appropriations measure. See Wash. Post, Dec.
28, 1985, at Al, col. 5. A trial court's ruling in favor of the city, however, was
reversed on appeal. Board of Elections & Ethics v. District of Columbia, 520 A.2d
671 (D.C. 1986). This episode represents an additional example of government's
avoiding responsibility for the homeless. In a 1979 policy statement, District of
Columbia Mayor Marion Barry, Jr. had stated that "shelter is a basic human right"
and that "anyone who requests, or is in apparent need of shelter is entitled to it."
Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941, 942-43 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Despite this earlier statement, Barry allowed
the city to challenge Initiative 17. Evidently, the Mayor does not want this "right"
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ited results. Although essential, a right to emergency shelter is not
a sufficient solution to the problem of homelessness. Litigation can
treat the symptoms of homelessness; legislation must address the
causes of the problem.
A. The Limitations of Litigation
In jurisdictions lacking statutory language establishing a right to
shelter, the homeless are unlikely to secure shelter through the courts.
An early litigation effort proposed that, once provided, government
shelter became an entitlement that could not be terminated without
due process protection. 204 This approach is a weak strategy because
it requires that shelter be provided by the government before any
constitutional rights attach. Moreover, due process does not require
the government to continue to provide shelter; the beneficiary merely
receives some type of procedural protection before the government
eliminates the benefit. 20 5
Homeless plaintiffs raised the entitlement-to-shelter argument in
Williams v. Barry, which involved the District of Columbia's intention
to close a shelter that it had voluntarily opened and maintained.2°6
The federal district court stated that although the city government
had the authority to eliminate the shelter's funding, 20 7 the city had
to provide procedural safeguards before doing so because the city's
previous actions had "fostered [an] expectation of continued shelter
services. "208
Among the city's actions deemed significant by the court was a
two-and-one-half year old policy of sheltering the homeless. The
mayor had articulated this policy in his official policy statement, and
created an official Commission on Homelessness. 209 In addition, the
city published notices of the opening of shelters.2 10 Taken in sum,
to bind government.
At present, government aid remains discretionary in many places, but other ballot
initiatives have been undertaken. See U.S.A. Today, Feb. 13, 1985, at 2A, col. 1
(describing potential ballot initiative in St. Louis).
204. Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
205. Id. at 947 ("[clity of Washington .. . enjoys an unquestioned right to cut
off ... funds" to the homeless).
206. Id. at 943.
207. Id. at 944 ("[w]hatever the humanitarian or emotional considerations, the
government assumes no obligation to house or feed indigent people").
208. Id. at 947.
209. Id. at 946.
210. Id.
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these actions constituted "the consistent, positive action ... necessary
to find an entitlement in the absence of a statute. '211
The Supreme Court adopted the concept of entitlement to public
benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly, 212 where it held that the procedural
due process protection of a hearing was required before the benefits
of certain welfare recipients could be terminated because the benefits
were essential to obtain survival needs. 21 The Williams court suggested
that the rationale of Goldberg was even more applicable to the
property interest in shelter because Goldberg merely dealt with the
"means" used to obtain essential needs, while Williams involved
shelter, one of those essential needs. That is, homeless men in Williams
who relied on the shelter would be deprived of an essential need,
not merely the means to obtain it, if the shelter closed. 21 4
Despite an extensive discussion of entitlements, the initial opinion
in Williams did not consider the type of procedural protections that
were necessary.215 In a later memorandum opinion, the district court
determined that due process would be satisfied by "particularized
notice detailing the reasons for the proposed closing and a reasonable
opportunity to prepare and submit written responses to the pro-
posal. ' 21 6 The shelter residents did not receive an oral hearing or a
written explanation for the closure because the case did not "involve
individual adjudicatory determinations, but instead involve[d] a more
broad-based legislative policy inquiry."21 7
Given the district court's earlier emphasis on the great reliance
that the homeless placed on government shelter, one would have
expected the court to require an oral hearing before allowing the
government to close the facility. However, judicial enforcement of
a right, which lacks a statutory or constitutional basis and which
would require the government to allocate resources, raises separation
of powers questions. Although courts should enforce rights established
211. Id. at 947. The theory of entitlements in public benefits was originally
proposed in Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
212. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
213. Id. at 264-65.
214. Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941, 945-46 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
215. The court stated, "[tihe necessary procedures in the instant case need be
decided, if necessary, after a full briefing and hearing on the merits. It is nonetheless
clear that some form of pre-termination notice and hearing should be provided."
Id. at 947 n.2 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270).
216. Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing unpublished
memorandum opinion No. 80-1104 (D.D.C. June 8, 1982)) [hereinafter Williams
III.
217. Id.
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by statute even if such action will require the legislature to spend
additional funds, rights that do not have a statutory basis produce
greater tension between legislative and adjudicative functions. This
causes many courts to abstain from a policy-making role.
When the district court ruling was appealed in Williams, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that, because of the
"legislative nature of the proposed termination of services," the
homeless plaintiffs had received sufficient procedural protection .
211
This is consistent with Goldberg because the two cases involve dif-
ferent types of government decisions. In Goldberg, the administrative
agency determined that certain individuals were no longer eligible for
AFDC benefits.21 9 Since this decision was similar to an individual
adjudication, one would expect an oral hearing to be provided.
Williams did not involve a determination that some of the homeless
individuals would be denied shelter. Rather, the government made
a "legislative" decision to close the shelter altogether.
20
The court of appeals' opinion in Williams bodes ill for the en-
titlement-to-shelter theory. In dicta, the court stated that it doubted
that the homeless men's property interest at issue was an entitlement
221
requiring due process protection. Although the homeless rely greatly
on government shelter, absent a statute, courts hesitate to infringe
on the legislative prerogative to determine social policy and allocate
resources. 222 Arguably, such deference is misplaced in entitlement
cases where the political branches have established a policy of shelter
218. Williams II, 708 F.2d at 791.
219. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256.
220. Williams, 490 F. Supp. at 943.
221. Another case in the District of Columbia stated that homeless families who
resided at a city operated shelter had "a colorable claim to an entitlement to some
minimal form of shelter" that could not be terminated without procedural protections.
Caton v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D.D.C. 1980). However, Caton reached
judgment before Williams II and the Caton court explicitly relied on the district
court's initial ruling in Williams. Id.
Even though the Caton court concluded that the plaintiff families might have a
property interest in continued shelter, this entitlement did not "encompass the right
to any specific level of services ... or the right to be lodged in a particular
neighborhood." Id. at 53. Consequently, the city was permitted to transfer the
homeless families to another shelter without furnishing a hearing. Id.
222. A concurring opinion rejected the entitlement claim:
No one has plausibly maintained that there is a constitutional or other
legal right to city provided shelter. There being no substantive constraints
on the decision whether to close the shelters, that decision is a wholly
political one and under no circumstances that I can imagine can there
be a constitutional right to have that political judgment set about and
circumscribed by procedural requirements.
Williams II, 708 F.2d at 793 (Bork, J., concurring).
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through a "mutually explicit understanding. ' 23 Courts can look to
the evidence surrounding the transaction as a guide to determine:
(1) if a policy has been established; and (2) whether a hearing should
be required because of the reliance interest of the beneficiaries. This
does not necessarily involve the judiciary in an allocation of resources
or a determination of social policy because the right to a hearing
does not guarantee a right to shelter. 224 Moreover, an oral hearing
provides an additional benefit by affording the homeless an oppor-
tunity to express their views in a public forum. Because the courts
provide the only genuine opportunity the homeless have to influence
the policies that affect their lives, 221 the judiciary should be receptive
to requests for entitlement hearings.
Because the entitlement theory is unlikely to prevail despite the
reliance the homeless place on shelter, the most effective method for
obtaining shelter remains the statutory provisions regarding care for
the needy. The limits of this approach in jurisdictions without a
statutory right to shelter, however, accentuates the need for legislation
to address homelessness.
B. The Need for Legislation
Major federal legislation is necessary to address the causes of
homelessness because the problem is a national one. 226 In the absence
of federal leadership, some states and localities have taken the leg-
islative initiative, 227 but they simply do not have the financial ca-
pabilities to solve the problem. 2 1
223. Williams, 490 F. Supp. at 947 (quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593,
601 (1972)).
224. Compare Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (right to hearing before
termination of welfare benefits) with Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941 (D.D.C.
1980), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (termination
of shelter subject to procedural due process).
225. At the time of Williams, the homeless were not even allowed to vote in
Washington, D.C. See Silas, supra note 50, at 37.
226. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 26 ("[b]ecause homelessness is a national
problem, the committee believes that the [flederal [g]overnment must take the leading
role in providing emergency aid to the homeless, and in seeking methods to prevent
such mass poverty").
227. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 41-44 (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52:27D-280 to -287 (West Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 50000-500003.3 (West Supp. 1986).
228. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 26 ("[tlhe remedies for homelessness
are clearly beyond the capacity of any single local government, community or
[sitate").
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1. State and Municipal Responses
Some states have taken greater steps than others toward meeting
the needs of the homeless. For example, the Massachusetts Legislature
has embarked on a policy of sheltering the homeless without being
ordered to do so by the judiciary. 229 More importantly, some states
have passed legislation aimed at preventing homelessness. New York
has provided financial assistance to build and rehabilitate long-term
housing for the homeless, 230 and New Jersey has allocated funds for
temporary rental assistance to the homeless and those facing evic-
tion.231 This legislation looks beyond emergency shelter attempts to
eliminate homelessness as a major social problem. Unfortunately,
states do not have the resources to undertake independent solutions,
and when one state enacts progressive legislation, a danger exists
that homeless people will migrate to that state to receive aid. 232
As the homeless crisis has mushroomed, some municipal govern-
ments have responded by adopting outreach programs to transport
the homeless to shelters and by enacting controversial emergency
hospitalization policies under which homeless people are involuntarily
removed from the streets for psychiatric evaluations. 233 Although these
programs provide immediate shelter, they are not long-term solutions
to homelessness. Moreover, the emergency hospitalization policies
bring the treatment needs of the mentally ill homeless into conflict
with their interests in personal liberty.2 4
229. Alter, Homelessness in America, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1984, at 20, 26; see
also MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 117, § 5A (West 1985). Since 1983, Massachusetts
spent $903 million on its housing programs. Matthews, What Can Be Done?,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1988, at 57-58 [hereinafter What Can Be Done?].
230. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 43 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
231. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-286 (West 1986).
232. Werner, supra note 51, at 15.
233. New York City's "cold weather" policy permits the police to drive the
homeless to shelters on cold nights. The city's "Project Help" sends psychiatrists
and social workers into the streets to monitor the health of the homeless. See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 15, 1985, at B5, col. 5. The newest aspect of the city's policy for
treating the homeless is an expansion of "Project Help." See N.Y. Times, Sept.
14, 1987, at B1, col. 1. The new plan, which began in October 1987, provides that
"homeless people 'in danger of serious harm within the reasonably foreseeable
future' will be taken to Bellevue Hospital for a 15-day examination." N.Y. Times,
Aug. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
234. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 3. New York City Mayor
Edward I. Koch's policy of involuntary hospitalization was "criticized by civil
libertarians" who feared the New York policy will allow commitment of people
"against their will." Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1985, at 29, col. 1. State
action taken to protect an endangered or incompetent individual is the essence of
civil commitment. Two rationales justify such action: (1) the police power of the
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Like many jurisdictions, New York has a statute that authorizes
extra-judicial confinement when a police officer believes a mentally
ill person may harm himself or others. 235 Based on this statute, New
York City developed its "cold weather" policy 236 which allows the
police to round up homeless people and transport them to hospitals
for evaluation. For the original policy to take effect, the temperature
had to fall below five degrees Fahrenheit .2 7 The articulated rationale
for the policy was that the cold "automatically creates the necessary
presumption that ... that person is in danger of dying. '23 8 In
anticipation of the winter of 1985-86, the threshold temperature was
raised to thirty-two degrees, allowing the police to intervene earlier. 23 9
The most recent of the city's policies to remove Manhattan's
homeless from the streets began in late October 1987.m The plan
state to prevent harm to others, and (2) the parens patriae power of the state to
safeguard incompetents in general. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507, 520
(5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
New York City's policies have received much criticism. The Coalition for the
Homeless stated that the policy would be unnecessary if shelters were safe and
humane, and the New York Civil Liberties Union believes the policy subverts state
law. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at B1l, col. 2.
235. N.Y. MENTAL. HYc. LAW § 9.41 (Consol. 1979). Washington, D.C., has a
similar statute. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-521 (1985). A police officer can hospitalize
a potentially dangerous person for diagnosis and emergency treatment without pro-
viding the procedural safeguards that accompany civil commitment. Id.
236. The policy was first adopted in Philadelphia. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1985,
at B8, col. 1.
237. Id. at Al, col. 2. The "effective temperature" incorporated the windchill
factor. Id.
238. Id. (statement of Mayor Koch). On the first night of the policy's operation,
two people were hospitalized. One, a middle-aged alcoholic, was released the next
day. The other was given medical care. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at B3, col. 6.
Reports from one night in 1985 indicated that fifty people were hospitalized. See
Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1985, at A6, cols. 3-4.
239. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at Al, col. 3. The city policy interprets § 9.41
broadly. The statute allows a police officer to "take into custody any person who
appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner which is likely
to result in serious harm to himself or others." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.41
(Consol. 1979). In effect, city officials decided that the statute embraces self-neglect.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at Bll, col. 2. This conclusion is arguable, especially
given the statute's description of the conduct that police must observe before they
can intervene. The statute requires that the person make "threats of or attempts
at suicide or serious bodily harm" or engage in "other conduct demonstrating that
he is dangerous to himself." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.41 (Consol. 1979). For
the current detentions to satisfy the statutory requirements, street-dwelling home-
lessness during cold weather must constitute "conduct" 'nanifesting danger to oneself.
In light of allegations that shelters are unsafe, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at
Bll, col. 1.; see also N.Y. Times, July 18, 1985, at Al, col. 2, the decision of
many homeless to sleep in the streets may be a rational choice between two evils.
240. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
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provides for mentally ill homeless people "in danger of serious harm"
to be "taken to Bellevue Hospital for a [fifteen]-day examination. '241
Critics of the program have focused their attention on the due process
aspects of involuntary commitment. 4 2 The case of Joyce Brown 243
illustrates the tension between providing treatment for the homeless
and respecting their rights as individuals.3 Joyce Brown was the
first person picked up and involuntarily hospitalized under the new
city program.245 She had "lived for nearly a year on the sidewalk
in front of a hot-air vent on Second Avenue near [Sixty-fifth] Street.'"24
On behalf of Ms. Brown, attorneys from the New York Civil Liberties
Union immediately challenged the constitutionality of the program's
involuntary commitment provision. 247 The trial court ordered Ms.
Brown's release. On appeal, however, the ruling was overturned. 241
In the abstract, the city's "cold weather" policy is justifiable in
that it attempts to treat people and prevent deaths such as the one
241. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1. The new program provides for
"four vans, each with a psychiatrist, a social worker and a nurse" to travel around
the city and "remove severely mentally ill homeless people from Manhattan streets
[and] parks." N.Y. Times., Oct. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1. The team brings these
individuals to the emergency room at Bellevue Hospital where "they are advised of
their legal rights," offered legal assistance and examined by the medical staff. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at B1, col. 2. The staff makes "a quick medical assessment,"
and then bathes and delouses the patient. Id. The patient's "psychiatric needs are
evaluated." Id. "If a patient requires hospitalization, the staff first seeks to convince
the patient to be admitted voluntarily .... If the patient refuses, the emergency
room doctor may ... overrule the decision" and hold the patient for 48 hours.
Id. After committing the patient the staff moves him "from the Bellevue psychiatric
emergency room to [a] new ward where special teams of social workers and counsellors
[will] find [a place] for [him] in [a] state [program] within an average of three
weeks." Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
242. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1. "Norman Siegel, executive director
of the New York Civil Liberties Union said he was beginning ... to meet with
the homeless people at Grand Central Terminal, Pennsylvania Station and the Port
Authority Bus Terminal to inform [them] of their rights." Id. at B9, col. 2; see
also N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
243. Ms. Brown uses two aliases: Ann Smith and Billy Boggs. N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1987, at B29, col. 5.
244. For a discussion of the Joyce Brown controversy, see generally N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1987, at B29, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at B30, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1987, at B2, col. 1.
245. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
246. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 1. City officials reported that Ms.
Brown "sometimes harangued passersby, burned and tore up money, and soiled
herself." N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
247. N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
248. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at B29, col. 1. Ms. Brown subsequently appealed,
but because she had been released her appeal was rendered moot. See Boggs v.
N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d
796 (1988).
426
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that befell an alley-dweller in 1982. In that case, a woman had lived
in a cardboard box and refused assistance. She eventually died of
hypothermia before the city could secure a court order to remove
her to a shelter. 249 Such episodes heighten both public and government
concern for the homeless and lead to the development of emergency
proposals such as the one applied to Ms. Brown, which allows the
government to intervene earlier3"1°
Nevertheless, New York City's current policies are clearly prob-
lematic. Nothing in the policies guarantees that the city will not
round up the homeless repeatedly for evaluation, thereby depriving
them of due process.251 In addition, this policy will not solve the
problems of the homeless mentally ill. Periodic hospitalization cannot
provide the necessary long-term care that many of the homeless
mentally ill require. 2 2 Moreover, enforcement of these policies may
result in harassment of the homeless 253 just as anti-vagrancy statutes
were used in the past to clear the streets of "undesirables.9 254
Finally, despite articulated good intentions, the underlying motive
of the city's policies may be to divert attention from the issues. 211
Studies suggest that one-third of the homeless are mentally ill,256 but
249. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1985, at E6, col. 3.
250. After two men froze to death in Washington, D.C., in 1985, residents urged
Mayor Barry to adopt the New York policy. Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al,
col. 5. Barry opposed forcible removal of the homeless. Instead, officials attempted
to persuade the homeless to enter shelters. Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1986, at A8, col.
4.
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law"). The city policy provides for
a lawyer and a hearing before a judge whenever a detained homeless person is
admitted to the hospital. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at BIl, col. 5.
252. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, at B4, col. 4.
253. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at BIl, col. 5. During the first week of the
32 degree policy in 1985, a 59-year-old woman was one of 13 people hospitalized.
She was handcuffed and taken from the neighborhood in which she had lived for
two years. Having already survived two winters in the streets, she was released the
next day. Id.
254. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1972). Concern
about the potential for discriminatory treatment is not merely a hypothetical con-
sideration. In 1981, Mayor Koch proposed a policy to detain the homeless for 72
hours so that they could be fed, bathed and given medication. N.Y. Times, Mar.
27, 1981, at B3, col. 3. While the ultimate goals of this policy might be beneficial,
the forcible detention of the homeless, absent any exigent circumstances, clearly
violates their due process rights.
255. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1985, at B31, col. 2.
256. Federal Response, supra note 1, at 424, 638 (report by Gov. Cuomo). In
New York City, one-third of the shelter residents are reportedly mentally ill, and
the majority of these are former psychiatric patients. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985,
at BIO, col. 5. But see H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 4 (50 percent of homeless
may suffer from mental illness).
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New York City's policy only addresses the small percentage of this
subgroup of the homeless who refuse to seek shelter. By focusing
on the mentally ill, the city perpetuates the stereotype that the
homeless are insane, while creating the perception that it is addressing
the problem. By categorizing the homeless as insane, no fundamental
economic dislocations need to be examined, and society can salve
its conscience by attributing the problem to pathology rather than
poverty.Y17 Furthermore, there may be an ulterior motive behind New
York City's hospitalization policy. The New York City policy may
shift responsibility for some of the homeless to the state. In September
1985, New York State agreed to take psychiatric patients into state
hospitals when city hospitals were full. 258 This agreement, coupled
with the city policy, could result in mentally ill homeless persons
returning to state institutions. As long as the city's policy is used
on an emergency basis and due process protections accompany long-
term confinement 5 9 some of the chronic mentally ill homeless might
benefit from treatment. Yet, even within the confines of this policy
there are problems because current hospital facilities are insufficient
to provide for the homeless mentally ill,26 and community care,
which is usually more appropriate and less expensive than hospital-
ization, is not a feature of the policy.26'
Clearly, the city's current policies are not a solution to homelessness
or to the problems of the mentally ill homeless. 262 Confining the
homeless for periodic psychiatric treatment and then releasing them
back to the streets does not alleviate the causes of homelessness. If
the city improved the condition of shelters instead, many more people
would utilize them. 263 For some of those currently on the streets,
257. Federal Response, supra note 1, at 424.
258. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, at B4, col. 4.
259. The New York Mental Hygiene Law provides for a hearing if requested by
the patient admitted for immediate care. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 9.39(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1986). Although Bellevue can only hold the patient for fifteen days, greater
process ought to accompany this confinement.
260. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
261. See Federal Response, supra note 1, at 227 (Nassau Action Coalition Report).
Treatment at a state institution in New York costs $44,500 annually per patient. A
Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) with clinical, rehabilitative and medical
services costs $27,000 per patient. A patient who does not receive community support
goes through the hospital system an average of four times a year. Id.
262. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1985, at B4, col. 4. The director of the psychiatric
emergency services at Bellevue Hospital stated that because of the shortage of care
facilities, the emergency hospitalization policy "will not go very far to meet long-
term needs of the homeless mentally ill." Id.
263. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1985, at 52, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1985, at
29, col. 1.
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long-term residential care is necessary. Focusing on the few mentally
ill people who refuse shelter diverts attention from the inadequacy
of the political response to homelessness, and ignores the need for
government to address the economic causes of the crisis. Aid for
the mentally ill homeless must be a component of a more extensive
policy aimed at alleviating homelessness generally.
2. Federal Response
a. Background
Even though homelessness is a national problem,264 the federal
government has only recently enacted legislation aimed at addressing
the causes of this social crisis. 265 Prior to June 1987, the federal
government had done little to aid the homeless. 266 Until 1987, the
only national program created for the sole purpose of assisting the
homeless was the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Emer-
gency Food and Shelter Program (FEMA).267 One of the major
problems with FEMA was that it operated on a temporary basis and
was dependent on yearly congressional budgeting. 268 More importantly,
the level of funding for the program was inadequate. From fiscal
years 1983 through 1985, Congress appropriated $210 million for the
FEMA emergency food and shelter services. 269 Unfortunately, "fund-
ing of $70 million a year falls drastically short" of what is necessary
to address homelessness. 270 As a point of comparison, New York
264. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 26.
265. See Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77,
101 Stat. 482 (1987) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11301-11505) [hereinafter McKinney
Act].
266. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 14 ("Itlhe few federal programs available
to aid the homeless have been disappointing, or have simply been too small to have
a significant impact in alleviating the plight of the homeless").
267. Id. at 20, 29. The other federal program created solely to help the homeless,
the Federal Task Force on Homelessness of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS Task Force) has had little impact. Id. In 1984, the HHS Task Force
had no formal budget. In 1985, the program allocated 8401o of its $325,000 budget
estimate to staff salaries and 1606 for administrative costs. In other words, the
budget failed to appropriate any money for direct assistance to the homeless. Id.
at 15.
The United States Code also permits the military to make its installations available
as shelters. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 2546(a)(1) (West Supp. 1988). This program, however,
has produced little aid. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 29-30.
268. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 20.
269. Id. at 19. FEMA distributed funds to states and municipalitites as well as
providers of private shelter. Id. These entities could have used the funds only to
purchase food and to supplement services or existing programs. Id.
270. Id.
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City targeted $217 million of its fiscal year 1985 budget to homeless
services, more than three times the average federal spending nation-
wide. 27'
Other than FEMA, the federal government relied on the medical,
supplemental and compensatory entitlement programs of the Social
Security Administration (SSA) to assist the homeless. 2 These enti-
tlement programs have been insufficient. 273 Many homeless individuals
are ineligible for various programs, 27 4 and those who receive entitle-
ments have difficulty retaining them. 275 In short, "[t]he existing [flederal
programs which could provide assistance have not reached the ma-
jority of homeless Americans. 2 76
During the first seven years of this decade, as the number of
homeless persons was growing, the Reagan Administration failed to
respond to the crisis. The Administration's attitude toward the prob-
lem was that "[t]he primary responsibility in helping the homeless
lies with local government and private and/or philanthropic organ-
izations .... This approach reflects President Reagan's emphasis on
community initiative and responsibility in partnership with federal
technical and material assistance.' '277 The Reagan Administration's
"approach" ignores the reality of the problem. Because homelessness
is a national problem, "the federal government must take the leading
role in providing emergency aid to the homeless, and in seeking
methods to prevent such mass poverty in the wealthiest country in
the world. '271 State and local governments do not have the capacity
271. Id.
272. Cf. id. at 20 ("[p]erhaps the most important programs that potentially could
provide assistance to the homeless are the medical, supplemental and compensatory
entitlement programs of the SSA").
273. Id. at 18, 20.
274. Id. at 20-21. Many homeless people do not receive benefits because they
lack fixed addresses to which benefits can be mailed. Nor do they have support
services necessary to help them establish eligibility and residency. Id. at 20. In 1986,
Congress attempted to rectify problems created by the homeless person's failure to
have an address. See Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act, supra note 62. Although
the Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act eliminates an obstacle, many homeless
individuals are simply "ineligible for certain forms of assistance such as SSDI, which
is only available to those with work histories, . . . Medicare, which is targeted only
to aged or disabled workers and Medicaid, which is often contingent upon eligibility
for AFDC or SSI." H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 21.
275. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 21.
276. Id. at 23.
277. Id. at 15 (quoting HHS Task Force, Shelter and Feeding the Homeless, a
resource guide for communities); see also Between the Cracks, supra note 52, at
80 (HHS Task Force emphasizing local nature of homelessness problem).
278. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 26.
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to remedy homelessness; only the federal government has the requisite
resources 279
In addition to adopting an erroneous philosophical approach to
the homeless crisis, the Reagan Administration has neglected the
homeless by failing to provide the "technical and material" assistance
of which it spoke. In 1985, the House of Representatives Committee
on Government Operations criticized the federal government's re-
sponse to homelessness as "inadequate, disorganized and ineffec-
tive." 2s° The Committee concluded that greater federal action was
necessary. "At a minimum, any national policies concerning the
homeless must address low income housing, the chronically mentally
ill, medical aid, transitional services and emergency food and shelter
services."28'
The House Committee recommended several national policies. First,
the President should declare homelessness a national emergency and
should direct all agencies to focus on expediting assistance to the
homeless.2 2 Second, agencies administering benefit programs should
undertake outreach efforts, relax eligibility requirements and expedite
the application process for the homeless. 283 Third, HUD-assisted hous-
ing programs should be expanded.2 '4 Fourth, Community Mental
Health Center model programs should be developed by the National
Institute of Mental Health, and local governments should be urged
to establish such centers with available block grants.2 5 Fifth, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Food and Shel-
ter Program (FEMA) should be expanded.2 6 Sixth, the Department
of Defense should contact local governments to offer its vacant
military installations as shelters, and should supply surplus food to
the homeless. 217 Seventh, the Public Health Service should provide
medical care to the homeless.2 8 Finally, Congress should fund shelter
demonstration projects, complete with medical and psychiatric care
and job counseling. 289
279. Id.
280. Id. at 14.
281. Id. at 27.
282. Id. at 28.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 28-29.
285. Id. at 29.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 29-30.
288. Id. at 30.
289. Id.
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b. Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act
In the face of executive branch inaction and growing societal
recognition of the homeless crisis, 290 Congress seized a leadership role
in addressing the problem. In June 1987, Congress passed the Stewart
B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (McKinney Act or the Act).29'
Incorporated into the McKinney Act are many of the recommen-
dations made by the House Committee on Government Operations.
Title II of the Act established an Interagency Council on the Homeless
(Council), comprised of cabinet officers, executive department heads
and others. 292 The basic duties of the Council include, inter alia, the
provision of professional and technical assistance to states, local
governments, and other public and private nonprofit organizations
to coordinate and maximize existing resources to assist the homeless,
and to encourage the development of innovative programs to address
homelessness. 293 The Council is also charged with monitoring and
evaluating assistance programs and recommending any improvements
that may be necessary. 294
Title III of the McKinney Act established an Emergency Food and
Shelter Program295 to provide grants to local governments and private
nonprofit organizations which are the direct suppliers of emergency
food and shelter to the homeless. 296 Congress authorized the appro-
priation of $15 million for fiscal year 1987 and $124 million for
fiscal year 1988 to accomplish the emergency purposes of title III
of the Act.297
Title IV of the Act provides for housing assistance in the form
of grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) to state and local governments and to private nonprofit
290. To dramatize the plight of the homeless, many congressmen and celebrities
participated in the "Grate American Sleep-Out" in Washington, D.C., in March
1987. House Majority Whip Tony Coelho (D.-Cal.) and actor Martin Sheen, among
others, slept on heating grates overnight to attract public attention to the problems
of the homeless. Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1987, at BI, col. 2. Prior to the Sleep-Out,
on May 25, 1986, activists staged "Hands Across America" to combat homelessness.
During this attempt to call public attention to homelessness, Americans formed a
human chain across the country. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
291. McKinney Act, supra note 265.
292. Id. §§ 201-202, 101 Stat. 482, 486 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11311-11312).
The Interagency Council replaces the HHS Task Force. Id. § 206, 101 Stat. 482,
489 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11316).
293. Id. § 203, 101 Stat. 482, 487 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11313).
294. Id.
295. Id. § 301, 101 Stat. 482, 489 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11311).
296. Id. § 311, 101 Stat. 482, 492 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11311).
297. Id. § 322, 101 Stat. 482, 493 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11352).
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organizations that aid the homeless. 29 These funds may be used for
renovation, rehabilitation or conversion of buildings into emergency
shelters; for shelter maintenance, operation insurance, utilities and
furnishings; and for the provision of essential services at shelters.299
To receive these funds, the supplier must supplement the federal
assistance with an equal amount of funds.3 °
Additional funds were authorized to be appropriated under title
IV for the Supportive Housing Demonstration Program. These grants
shall be provided to programs that develop innovative housing for
homeless families with children; deinstitutionalized homeless indivi-
duals; and homeless people with mental and physical disabilities. 0
"Supportive housing" includes both "transitional housing," which
facilitates the movement of homeless individuals into independent
living, and permanent community-based housing for handicapped
homeless individuals. 0 2 Equal matching funds must be supplied by
any recipient who uses federal funds to acquire or rehabilitate a
building for the purposes of .providing supportive services;3 3 however,
HUD may provide up to seventy-five percent of the annual operating
expenses of transitional housing.c 4 Regarding permanent housing for
handicapped citizens, each state must supplement the federal funds
with an equal amount of state and local funds.30 5 All of the non-
federal funds must be used for the acquisition or rehabilitation of
permanent housing for the handicapped, and not more than fifty
percent of the funds may be from the local government. 3°6
To carry out the purposes of title IV housing assistance, Congress
authorized appropriations of $100 million for fiscal year 1987 and
$120 million for fiscal year 1988 for the emergency shelter program.30 7
298. Id. § 412, 101 Stat. 482, 496 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11372).
299. Id. § 414, 101 Stat. 482, 497 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11374). Shelters
may only use the funds to provide services related to employment, health, drug
abuse or education if the local government has not provided such services during
any part of the preceding 12-month period and the local government does not use
more than 15076 of the federal funds for these services. Id.
300. Id. § 415, 101 Stat. 482, 497 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11375).
301. Id. § 421, 101 Stat. 482, 498-99 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11381).
302. Id. § 422(12), 101 Stat. 482, 500 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11382).
303. Id. § 425(a), 101 Stat. 482, 503 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11385).
304. Id. § 423(a)(3), 101 Stat. 482, 501 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11383).
305. Id. § 425(b)(1), 101 Stat. 482, 503 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11385).
306. Id. HUD may waive the requirements of this section if the state can dem-
onstrate an inability to provide an equal amount of funds due to severe financial
hardship and the local government agrees to contribute funds from non-federal
sources equal to the amount of the contribution waived for the state. Id. § 425(b)(2),
101 Stat. 482, 503 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11385(b)(2)).
307. Id. § 417, 101 Stat. 482, 498 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11377).
19881
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
For those years, Congress appropriated $80 million and $100 million
respectively for supportive housing.30
Other major features of the McKinney Act include provisions
establishing grants from the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices to health care providers who care for the homeless, 3°9 and to
states to establish community mental health services for the chronically
mentally ill homeless. 10 The McKinney Act also establishes that the
Secretary of Labor shall make grants to states, local public agencies,
private organizations or businesses that conduct education and job
training for the homeless.3 ' Additional titles of the Act address food
assistance for the homelesss,1 2 provisions for homeless veterans,"'
and use of surplus federal property to assist the homeless.314
c. Criticism of McKinney
The McKinney Act attempts to identify and address many of the
needs of the various segments of the homeless population. The Act
represents an improvement from the seven years of federal inaction
that preceded it. The Act has significant shortcomings, however,
which can be classified into two broad sets of concerns. For con-
venience, these categories will be labelled policy and operational
criticisms. The first category of criticisms focuses on the policies that
were included or excluded from the Act's coverage. The second
category focuses on problems inherent in the operation or imple-
mentation of the Act.
308. Id. § 428, 101 Stat. 482, 504 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11383). This title
provides for additional assistance in the form of non-interest bearing advances and
grants for facilities to aid the homeless. See id. §§ 431-444, 101 Stat. 482, 504-08
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11391-11394). Moreover, this title authorizes a $35
million increase in the budget for housing assistance pursuant to § 8(e)(2) of the
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982). See McKinney Act,
supra note 265, § 441, 101 Stat. 482, 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11401).
309. See id. § 601, 101 Stat. 482, 511 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 256).
310. See id. § 611, 101 Stat. 482, 516 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 290cc-21).
311. Id. § 731, 101 Stat. 482, 528 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11441).
312. See id. §§ 801-814, 101 Stat. 482, 489-93 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11331-
11352); see also supra note 62 (regarding Homeless Eligibility Clarification Act).
313. See McKinney Act, supra note 265, § 901, 101 Stat. 482, 538 (codified at
29 U.S.C.A. § 1721). In February 1987, Congress transferred additional funds to
FEMA to provide funds for community-based psychiatric residential treatment for
chronically mentally ill homeless veterans. See Act of Feb. 12, 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-6, 101 Stat. 92, 92-94 (codified at 38 U.S.C. 620(c)).
314. McKinney Act, supra note 265, § 501, 101 Stat. 482, 509 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 11411).
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i. Policy Concerns
The major policy shortcoming of the McKinney Act is that it does
not establish a national right to overnight shelter. This is an essential
element of any program aimed at alleviating homelessness; the im-
mediate physical needs of this population must be addressed first.
In the absence of a right to shelter, the homeless must rely on the
discretion of state and local governments, or they must seek private
charity. At the very least, decent overnight shelter should be a
statutory-if not fundamental-right. 315
Moreover, there are significant adverse consequences of Congress'
failure to establish a right to shelter as part of the McKinney Act.
First, the McKinney Act may have no impact in states or localities
that do not accept any obligation to house the homeless.31 6 The
McKinney Act only provides grants to shelter providers who apply
for funds; it does not establish local shelters, nor does it mandate
that local shelters exist. Accordingly, no uniform policy regarding
homelessness will apply nationwide, 17 and states and localities that
provide shelter will still be concerned about doing more than their
"fair share."3 8
Second, this problem is exacerbated by the McKinney Act's funding
mechanism. Title IV, the housing assistance provision of the Act,
which authorizes appropriations for various types of shelter and
housing programs, requires states and localities to supplement the
federal funds with an equal amount of matching funds.319 A similar
315. A recent national poll indicated that a "substantial majority" of Americans
believe that the government should provide each citizen with food and shelter. See
What Can Be Done?, supra note 229, at 57.
316. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text regarding hostile attitudes
toward the homeless.
317. Great Britain has enacted national 'legislation on the homeless. See Housing
(Homeless Persons) Act, 1977 (Housing Act). Parliament passed this act because
local authorities had ignored ministerial directives to house the homeless. See Robson
& Watchman, The Homeless Persons' Obstacle Race: 2, 1981 J. Soc. WELFARE L.
65, 70. Although the homeless only receive limited protection under the Housing
Act, id. at 81, the program is a uniform, national undertaking. Four categories of
"priority need" homeless are entitled to permanent accommodations. These categories
include pregnant women, homeless people with dependent children, those who are
homeless as a result of fire or other emergency, and the aged, mentally ill or
physically disabled homeless. Robson & Watchman, The Homeless Persons' Obstacle
Race (pt. 1), 1981 J. Soc. WELFARE L. 1, 7-8. Although the Housing Act does not
eliminate the problems that cause homelessness, id. at 1, it attempts to alleviate
some of the resulting hardship.
318. See Werner, supra note 51, at 15.
319. McKinney Act, supra note 265, § 415, 101 Stat. 482, 497 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 11385).
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matching requirement exists with respect to funds for transitional
housing and for permanent housing for handicapped homeless in-
dividuals.320 Thus, title IV of the Act, which authorizes the most
funding and encourages the development of several necessary housing
programs, also requires states and localities to contribute a greater
percentage of the funds than for any other program. Because of the
importance of these types of programs in attempting to develop long-
term solutions to homelessness, a more flexible funding mechanism,
which places more responsibility on the federal government is nec-
essary.321
This funding arrangement is problematic for the same reasons that
the failure to establish a right to overnight shelter is a problem.
State and local governments that do not already house the homeless
are unlikely to apply for grants because they will not want to provide
matching funds. 22 Even if state or local governments are not pre-
disposed against sheltering the homeless, they may not have the
resources to contribute equal matching funds. Therefore, homeless
people in many cities will not receive the benefit of the most important
provisions of the McKinney Act which attempt to address the long-
term housing problems.
A third policy shortcoming of the McKinney Act is that it does
not establish a right to shelter for homeless families with dependent
children. The statute encourages the creation of model programs to
shelter homeless families with children,3 23 but does not mandate that
320. Id. § 425, 101 Stat. 482, 503 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11385).
321. The statute contains a better provision establishing matching funds for job
training programs. Section 735 provides:
(a) PAYMENTS- The Secretary shall pay to each applicant having an
application approved under section 733 the [flederal share of the cost of
activities described in the application.
(b) FEDERAL SHARE-
(1)(A) The [fnederal share for each fiscal year shall be not less than 50
percent nor more than 90 percent.
(b) The [flederal share shall be determined by the Secretary for each
recipient under this subtitle based upon the ability of the recipient to
meet the non-[flederal share of the cost of the program for which assistance
is sought.
(2) The non-[flederal share of payments under this subtitle may be in
cash or in kind fairly evaluated, including plant equipment or services.
(c) LIMITATION- The Secretary may not make grants in any [sitate in
an aggregate in excess of 15 percent of the amount appropriated to carry
out this subtitle in each fiscal year.
Id. § 735, 101 Stat. 482, 529-30 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11445).
322. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
323. See McKinney Act, supra note 265, § 421, 101 Stat. 482, 498-99 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11381).
THE HOMELESS
shelter be provided. While the creation of a national right to shelter
for homeless adults may be a controversial policy, establishing a right
to shelter for dependent children is a qualitatively different propo-
sition. Children, more so than adults, are vulnerable. They cannot
be expected to adjust to life on the streets, nor do they have the
means to achieve economic independence and acquire housing. Even
if children and their families manage to survive, the consequences
of living on the streets are likely to be devastating. Moreover, homeless
families may constitute the beginning of a self-perpetuating underclass
of homeless individuals.
Given these concerns, a right to shelter for homeless families should
have been part of the McKinney Act. Unlike the situation that exists
with homeless adults, the machinery for implementing such a program
is already in place. The regulations implementing the AFDC program3 24
require participating states to elect whether they will provide shelter
to homeless families as one of their emergency services. 25 Sheltering
homeless children should not be a discretionary activity under AFDC
because the statutory purpose of the program is to "encourag[e] the
care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of
relatives. 3 26 In light of the increase in the number of homeless
families, a major target of any program aimed at the causes of
homelessness must be this population.
ii. Operational Concerns
In addition to the fundamental policy objections, there are several
operational problems associated with the McKinney Act. The most
obvious operational criticism of the Act is that it only authorizes
amounts of funds that may be appropriated.32 7 In fact, Congress did
not deliver all the funds authorized by the Act.3 28 It appropriated
approximately $700 million over two fiscal years.3 29 Although this is
a large sum in the abstract, it is not sufficient to address the
problem.330 For example, New York City alone will spend $500 million
324. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 1987).
325. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a)(4) (1986); see also supra notes 147-62 and ac-
companying text.
326. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1983).
327. See supra notes 297-314 and accompanying text.
328. See What Can Be Done?, supra note 229, at 57-58 ("[what the legislative
branch offered with one hand, it then throttled back with the other").
329. Id.
330. Id. One study indicated that 7.5 million new housing units would be needed
by the year 2000 to prevent low income people from becoming homeless in continuing
large numbers. This program would cost approximately $300 billion. Id.
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in housing this year, but its needs are estimated at two and one-
half times that amount."'
The failure to appropriate McKinney Act funds demonstrates an
additional problem with the Act. Like the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency's Emergency Food and Shelter Program criticized
in the, House Committee on Government Operations Report in 1985,332
there is no continuity of funding source,333 because the McKinney
Act depends on annual budgeting and appropriation. The McKinney
Act authorized appropriations for two fiscal years; however, the
homeless crisis is likely to continue well into the foreseeable future.334
Likewise, the duration of some of the substantive provisions of
the Act is troubling. For example, the Interagency Council on the
Homeless will cease to exist in three years,335 and the job training
program terminates on October 1, 1990.336 This suggests that Congress
is looking for a "quick fix" by throwing money at the problem for
the short term. Unfortunately, the statistics regarding the homeless
33 7
depict a severe socio-economic dislocation. Absent a long term com-
mitment to this social crisis, the problems which result in homelessness
will continue to exist. 338
In sum, the problems associated with the operation and imple-
mentation of the McKinney Act, coupled with the basic policy short-
comings, depict fundamental flaws in the congressional approach.
While the Act is better than anything the federal government has
accomplished to date, it remains inadequate. Bolder steps are required,
both at the policy-formulating stage and in the program-implementing
process.
331. Id.
332. See H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 20; see also supra notes 267-71
and accompanying text.
333. See What Can Be Done?, supra note 229, at 58. The federal budget deficit
complicates the dynamic associated with the funding process. See id. With fewer
funds to be divided among government programs, the homeless are unlikely to
receive the necessary funding. As a society, we should make a greater, long term
commitment of resources to this problem, but the McKinney Act fails in this respect.
334. H.R. REP. No. 47, supra note 1, at 29.
335. McKinney Act, supra note 265, § 209, 101 Stat. 482, 489 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 11319).
336. Id. § 741, 101 Stat. 482, 532 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 11450).
337. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text; see also What Can be Done?,
supra note 229, at 58 ("the homeless signify that the country is fraying badly along
its economic and social hems").
338. In addition, the Reagan Administration's antipathy toward social spending
legislation suggests that the executive branch will not eagerly implement the programs
that are available. What Can Be Done?, supra note 229, at 58. ("[t]o show his
displeasure with the [McKinney Act], Ronald Reagan signed it at night, eliminating
the bright media glow that signals life around Washington").
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Vl. Conclusion
During the first seven years of the 1980's, the homeless crisis has
grown to epidemic proportions. At the same time, the costs associated
with the problem have escalated. These costs are not merely those
associated with providing shelter. The more important costs are less
easily quantifiable. These costs range from the physical, psychological
and economic impoverishment suffered by each homeless individual,
to the psychological costs experienced by citizens who are not home-
less, but who are disturbed by the problem.33 9
Beyond individual costs, there are enormous costs to society. The
failure to deal with this potential underclass of homeless families
will inflict psychological injury to the national consciousness. As
Robert Hayes, the foremost legal advocate for the homeless has
observed, "[t]he homeless living and dying on the streets of our
cities are a standing challenge to the moral -legitimacy of this [n]ation."
In short, "right now, the homeless are the shame of America."'' 4
In light of the magnitude of the homeless crisis, comprehensive
national solutions are necessary. Yet, for much of this decade, the
federal government has failed to act. In the interim, homeless ad-
vocates have pursued judicial remedies to assist their clients. To a
large extent, these advocates have been successful; some courts have
enforced the rights of the homeless, requiring states and localities
to supply emergency shelter and services. Judicial resolution of these
issues is appropriate because, the homeless form the prototypical
powerless group. As the victims of discrimination and stereotyping,
separated from the social network and lacking any economic power,
the homeless cannot influence the social policy that affects their lives.
The judicial intervention advocated by this Article is not judicial
creation of social policy; rather, it is a broad interpretation of statutes
passed by the legislature. Thus, the type of judicial decisions approved
and encouraged here are usually limited to ordering the executive
branch to comply with the legislative policy by providing safe, emer-
gency shelter. While important, this is necessarily a stopgap measure.
Long term solutions to the causes of homelessness must derive
from the political process. Although the McKinney Act is better than
any federal action undertaken thus far, it has significant shortcomings.
339. See id. at 56. A recent poll indicated that eight out of ten Americans are
"embarrassed" by homelessness. Id. The poll also ranked homelessness as the most
important problem facing the nation after the federal budget deficit. Id.
340. Homelessness in America, suprv note 3, at 60 (testimony of Robert Hayes,
National Coalition for 'the Homeless).
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Because of the Act's policy and operational flaws, this legislation is
unlikely to provide sufficient assistance to many people in the homeless
population.14' In particular, the McKinney Act errs in failing to
establish a federal right to shelter. A right to decent, overnight shelter
must be the cornerstone of any comprehensive approach to the
homeless crisis. Without this right, no uniform national policy will
develop because the provision of shelter will remain discretionary
with state and local governments.
Once the right is established, judicial action to enforce this federal
right will become possible in all states, and a regime of rational,
principled decision-making will be available to the homeless regardless
of the peculiarities of the laws in particular jurisdictions. The homeless
are still waiting for society to adopt this principled, comprehensive
approach. In the meantime, our society continues to warehouse the
homeless at night, so they do not die on the street, while ignoring
them during the day.
341. Cf. H.R. REp. No. 47, supra note 1, at 20 ("the entitlement programs do
not work for many homeless persons") (quoting HHS report to the President, Aug.
15, 1984).
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